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COMMENTS
ARMED REPRISALS DURING INTERMEDIACY - A NEW
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the subject matter of international law has been an-
alyzed according to a war-peace dichotomy.' Whether the focus is on
jurisdiction, commerce, treaties, recognition, sovereignty, boundaries, or
the use of force, the approach has always been to set forth principles
which describe the conduct of nations during either peacetime or wartime.
But the conduct of states is not always amenable to this two-fold classifi-
cation, and therefore, it is not surprising that enlightened thinkers2
1. W. FRIEDMANN, 0. LIsSITZYN & R. PUGH, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS 899 (1969) [hereinafter cited as W. FRIEDMANN & 0. LissiTZYN] ; 2 G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 39 (1968). Professor Schwarzen-
berger states that:
The three states of international law - a state of peace, status mixtus and state
of war - are abstractions on a level comparable to that of the fundamental
principals of international law .... By reference to these, it is possible to divide
the rules of international law into three categories: the rules of the law of peace,
those pertaining to a status mixtus, and those governing states of war and
neutrality.
Id.
2. Publicists are an important source of law in public international law.
Historically, there have been few judicial determinations as compared with the
common law system. Hence, there, is a void of developed case law which is filled,
in part, by the writings of experts. In a sense, international law treatises become
a substitute for judicial opinions. G. FINCH, THE SOURCES OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 30 (1937) ; Oppenheim, The Science of International Law, 2 AM. J. INT'L L.
315 (1908). Article 38(4) of The Statute of the International Court of Justice also
lists as one of the sources of law "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists." I.C.J. STAT. art. 38, para. 4 (emphasis added).
The statement of Justice Gray in the Paquete Habana case suggests further
the importance of publicists as a source of law. Mr. Justice Gray suggests:[Wihere there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act orjudicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations;
and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by
years of labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well
acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by
*udicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the
law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ; accord, Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,
163 (1895); 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES 18 (W. Lacy ed. 1889); H. WHEATON,
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 15 (8th ed. R. Dana 1866). Contra, The Queen v. Keyn,
2 Ex. D. 63, 202-04 (1876), cited in W. FRIEDMANN & 0. LISSITZYN, supra note 1,
at 85.
The other sources of law recognized by Article 38 of The Statute of the
International Court of Justice include: (1) international conventions; (2) inter-
national customs; (3) general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and(4) ex aequo et bono. The latter is a method of deciding questions according to a
standard of fairness, justice, good conscience and equity. It is distinguished from
equity in that ex aequo et bono lacks a well defined regime of legal principles; i.e.,laches, "clean hands," and irreparable injury. Ex aequo et bono is even more
flexible than equity in fashioning a remedy to a particular issue.
(270)
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have suggested the recognition of a status between war and peace.3 This
in-between status, known as intermediacy, status mixtus, or quasi-bellig-
erency,4 more accurately reflects the way states actually conduct their
affairs while, at the same time, avoiding the legal consequences of label-
ing an international conflict a war.5 If such a framework were used and
nations became accustomed to status mixtus, the psychology of settling
disputes might be altered. States might not be disappointed with partial
solutions; rather, they might view such a settlement as not only feasible,
but desirable as an alternative to open conflict.6 Hence, a lessening of
international tensions might ensue.7 Admittedly, these objectives are
utopian. At worst, we will be left with the present framework within
which we are now operating. At best, we will be able to develop a new
framework, permitting a realistic appraisal of the conduct of nations,
and better structuring international expectations.
Intermediacy, according to Professor Jessup, has three basic charac-
teristics: (1) a continuing relationship of "hostility and strain" between
the states involved; (2) a conflict over issues so "fundamental and deep-
rooted" that a solution to any one of them would not ease the strain; and
(3) a desire by both nations not to go to war.8 Once it is established
that intermediacy should be used as the relevant framework for analysis,
it is then necessary to set forth principles of law which historically were
employed only in the context of war or peace. Within status mixtus,
there is a void of applicable law. This void is particularly noticeable
with respect to armed reprisals.9 The question whether such acts of
3. Jessup, Should International Law Recognize an Intermediate Status Between
War and Peace?, 48 Am. J. INT'L L. 100-01 (1954).
4. Although it is submitted that the term "intermediacy" connotes a less violent
relationship than "quasi-belligerency," all three of these terms will be used inter-
changeably throughout this Comment.
5. See Jessup, supra note 3, at 100-01. Labeling a conflict a war has significant
legal implications. The effects of war are:
a. To break off diplomatic and other non-hostile relations of the belligerent
states.
b. To modify treaty relations of the belligerent states.
c. To modify the status of persons within the belligerent states.
d. To modify the status of property within the belligerent states.
e. To change the relations of belligerents and allies in accord with treaties
of alliance.
f. To change the relations of belligerents and states not parties to the war.
g. To modify the relations of persons subject to the jurisdiction of states
not parties to the war and the belligerents.
G. WI.soN, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 262 (3d ed. 1939). See also G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 1, at 63-106.
6. See Jessup, supra note 3, at 100-01.
7. Id.
8. Id. See also note 5 supra.
9. For purposes of this Comment, reprisals are also referred to as retaliatory
acts, acts of self-help and acts of reprisals. This terminology may not be consistent
with other publicists' use of the word. Different authors have made distinctions
that they feel are useful. For example, Hindmarsh states:
Public reprisals . . . may be defined as coercive measures taken by one state
against another, without belligerent intent, in order to secure redress for, or
COMMENTS
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retaliation are permissible during such a period has not been addressed.
Consequently, if international law permits reprisals during intermediacy,
there are no guidelines as to how much and what kind of force may
legally be employed. This Comment posits that armed reprisals are per-
missible during intermediacy and, in so doing, describes the quantity and
quality of force which the international legal community should tolerate.
A test is established by which the legality of reprisals can be judged.
The test is applied to a particular example in a step-by-step fashion to
better acquaint the reader with its intricacies; it is then reapplied to an-
other situation to reaffirm its validity.
The initial phase of the analysis involves an examination of the
origin of present-day reprisals, noting the permissible limits of private
reprisals during ancient and medieval times. Having outlined the history
of reprisals, the customary rule of armed reprisals is reviewed to test
its adequacy as a framework for analysis in a status mixtus setting.10
The provisions of the United Nations Charter" concerning reprisals are
also examined for the same purpose. The issue addressed in that section
is whether retaliatory acts of any kind are permitted under the Charter.
Lastly, several proposals are set forth as to what the international law
should be with respect to armed reprisals during intermediacy.
Throughout this Comment, reference will be made to the Beirut Air-
port raid conducted by Israel on December 28, 1968, against the Lebanese
Government in retaliation for the destruction of an El Al airplane and
prevent recurrence of acts or omissions which under international law constitute
international delinquency.
A. HINDMARSH, FORCE IN PEACE 58 (1933). Professor Hyde gives the word "reprisal"
a more restrictive meaning:
For sake of clearness, and for the purpose of preserving solid distinctions of
both historical and etymological worth, it is deemed wise to confine the use of
the term "reprisal" to the act of taking or withholding of any form of property
of a foreign State or its nationals, for the purpose of obtaining, directly or
indirectly, reparation on account of the consequences of internationally illegal
conduct for which redress has been refused.
II C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1662 (1945). Grover Clark makes a distinction
between reprisal and retaliation:
Speaking exactly, the only common characteristic of acts of reprisal and acts of
retaliation is the use of force; the two kinds of acts differ fundamentally in their
purposes. Retaliation involves the use of force to inflict an injury in return for
an injury inflicted; reprisal involves the use of force to secure compensation for a
loss by the taking of property.
Clark, The English Practice with Regard to Reprisals by Private Persons, 27 AM. J.
INT'L L. 694, 702 (1933).
Other authors make other distinctions, see, e.g., II J. WESTLAKE, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 6-7 (2d ed. 1913). For the purposes of this Comment, such distinctions
are not crucial to the analysis. What is important is that the commentator defines
the way he will use the terms before he begins his analysis. See generally, Falk, The
Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 415, 443
(1969) ; Jessup, supra note 3.
This Comment is addressing only the issue of whether and to what extent
reprisals are permissible during intermediacy. The discussion of self-defense is
necessary because the United Nations Charter does not mention armed reprisals;
it speaks only in terms of self-defense.
10. See pp. 277-88 infra.
11. See pp. 288-98 infra.
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the murder of an Israeli national by two Lebanese guerrillas two days
earlier.12  This incident has been chosen as the initial example because
it was an armed reprisal which occurred during a classic status mixtus
relationship. 13 Although there are other international relationships which
can be characterized as quasi-belligerent, this one appears most note-
worthy in light of a twenty-three year history of hostility over issues
that are "fundamental and deep-rooted" - the existence of Israel as a
state.1 4 Therefore, it seems appropriate to use the Beirut incident as the
primary test of the thesis submitted herein.
After this step-by-step analysis, the proposed test will be examined
again with respect to the reprisals undertaken by the United States against
North Vietnam for the alleged wrongs committed during the Gulf of
Tonkin incident. In that section, the analysis is restricted to the reprisal
issue. Any discussion of the legality of that conflict in terms of inter-
national law, or its constitutionality in terms of municipal law, falls
outside the purview of this Comment. The purpose of employing a second
example is: (1) to insure a thorough examination of the theory set forth,
and (2) to demonstrate that the test proposed has not been offered
merely as a justification for the acts of one nation, namely Israel. It is
the task of international law to describe the manner in which states do,
in fact, conduct their affairs. At the same time, international law seeks
to prescribe a course of conduct for states which will produce a minimal
world order in which the states of the world can survive. In short, the
second example is employed to bolster the validity of the theory set forth.
II. HISTORY
Long before the birth of the nation-state system, reprisals were
undertaken by individuals, usually in pursuance of some property right.' 5
12. U.N. Doc. S/7930/Add. at 107-08 (1968) ; Falk, supra note 9, at 416; Note,
The Beirut Retaliation - A Case Study of the Use of Force in Times of Peace,
2 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 105-06 (1969) ; N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1968, at 1, col. 2;
N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1968, at 2, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1968, at 1, col. 7;
N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1968, at 1, col. 6.
The term "fedayeen," used to describe guerrillas operating in the Middle East,
literally translated means "men of terror." The Al Fatah are the most prominent
and largest group of Palestinian guerrillas. The Guerrilla Threat in the Middle East,
TIME, Dec. 13, 1968, at 29. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) is, on the other hand, the most extreme group of guerrillas. A Voice of
Extremism, TIME, June 13, 1969, at 42. According to an interview between the
PFLP leader, Dr. George Habash and TIME correspondent, Lee Griggs, the purpose
of this guerrilla group is to regain Palestine. Dr. Habash said that his group is
totally opposed to any peaceful solution even if liberation takes ten to twenty years.
Their aim is "a democratic, non-Zionist Palestine." Id.
13. Falk, supra note 9, at 434. Professor Falk states:
The situation in the Middle East is one of the quasi-belligerency in which there
is an agreed ceasefire and a de facto situation of hostility that frequently results
in intergovernmental violence.
14. For a brief history of the legal issues involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict,
see O'Brien, International Law and the Outbreak of War in the Middle East, 1967,
11 ORaIs 692 (1967).
15. Maccoby, Reprisals as a Measure of Redress Short of War, 2 CAMBRiDGE
L.J. 60, 61 (1924-26).
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These specific or private reprisals can be traced to Biblical times when a
man whose livestock was stolen or killed was permitted to recover up
to five times his losses. 16 A man whose wife was intentionally injured
by another was permitted, in certain instances, to use physical force
against the wrongdoer.' 7 In Athens, there was a law which allowed the
relatives of an Athenian, slain in a foreign land or another city-state,
which refused to punish or extradite the responsible party, to seize three
citizens of that state and bring them before an Athenian court for retri-
bution.18 However, it was not until the early Middle Ages, primarily in
Europe, that the concept of private reprisals reached fruition.1 9 Begin-
ning in the last quarter of the thirteenth century, private reprisals were
considered legitimate only if perpetrated under letters of marque granted
by the sovereign of the aggrieved party. Letters of marque authorized
the individual to perform acts of self-help against the state directly or
vicariously liable for the injury.2 0 As a matter of custom, the issuance
of the letters was preceded by an unsuccessful request for redress upon
the state of the alleged wrongdoer.2 1 Typically, the provocation was a
theft of personal property, and the retaliation a seizure of goods from
the countrymen of the wrongdoer,22 not necessarily the wrongdoer him-
self. Rarely were goods destroyed in the name of reprisal.23
In order to obtain letters of marque from the issuing authority,24
the injured party had to show: (1) that an act violating one of his rights
16. Exodus 22:1 states:
If a man steals an ox or a sheep, and kills it or sells it, he shall pay five oxenfor an ox, and four sheep for a sheep. He shall make restitution; if he has
nothing, then he shall be sold for his theft. If the stolen beast is found alive in
his possession, whether it is an ox or an ass or a sheep, he shall pay double."
This passage suggests that a disproportionate response was not only permitted but
was commanded.
17. Exodus 21:22-25 states:
When men strive together and hurt a woman with child, so that there is a
miscarriage, and yet no harm follows, the one who hurt her shall be fined,
according as the woman's husband shall lay upon him; and he shall pay as thejudges determine. If any harm follows, then you shall give life for life, eye for eye,
tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound,
stripe for stripe.
In contrast to the preceding passage, this passage suggests that only a proportionate
response is permitted with respect to the quantity of force employed. In light of this
provision and the provision with respect to stolen livestock, there seems to be no
answer to the question whether disproportionate responses were permitted, and, if so,
under what circumstances.
18. II L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 138 (7th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1952).
19. See Maccoby, supra note 15, at 60-67.
20. E. COLBERT, RETALIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-50 (1948); A. HIND-
MARSH, FORCE IN PEACE: FORCE SHORT OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 43-56
(1933) ; II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 138-39; Maccoby, supra note 15, at 61.
21. See E. COLBERT, supra note 20, at 15-50.
22. See Maccoby, supra note 15, at 60.
23. E. COLBERT, supra note 20, at 47; Maccoby, supra note 15, at 60.
24. In England, the issuing authority for the letters of marque was the Keeper
of the Privy Seal and the Chancellor whose duty it was to examine the facts before
issuing the letters. In France, petitions for reprisal orders were submitted by the
aggrieved party to the Parlement, and then were examined judicially. In the
Italian cities, the judiciary handled all requests for these reprisal orders. See Maccoby,
supra note 15, at 64.
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had been committed ;25 (2) that a named person or persons were respon-
sible ;26 and (3) that a request for reparations had been unsuccessful in
the courts of the delinquent's country.27 If all these requisites were
satisfied, the appropriate state authority would issue a: written order
permitting the injured party to seize property from the country of the
bandit proportional in value to what had been stolen 28 In addition, the
medieval reprisal doctrine required a cessation of seizures once the
objective of the reprisal was accomplished. 29 The goods that were seized
were then brought before the sovereign or his representative for an ac-
counting. Goods seized improperly or in excess of the claim would then
be ordered returned by such authority.80 This procedure, though wide-
spread, did not insure that the person undertaking the reprisal would
not provoke open hostilities with the target state.8' During the late four-
teenth and early fifteenth centuries, concern over the dangers of private
reprisals increased, and rulers began to realize that the granting of letters
of marque did not sufficiently control the outbreak of violence.8 2  Hence,
a series of bilateral treaties were entered into, under which nations
limited their power to grant reprisal orders against one another. 38 Despite
such efforts at control, hostilities did not cease because states, under
the guise of private reprisals, began conducting reprisals to further
their own interests. By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, violent
incidents of self-help purporting to be private acts, but which in fact
were state-directed reprisals, were occurring throughout the European
continent.8 4 Concurrently, states began to use armies instead of private
citizens to further their interests.8 5 No longer was force limited merely
to the seizure of private property, but instead, involved the destruction of
property and the loss of life.8 6 It was not this increase in public (or state-
directed) reprisals that caused the corresponding decrease in private
reprisals. Rather, their unpopularity was due to more effective remedies
for injured foreigners, and the desire by a growing community of mer-
25. E. COLBERT, supra note 20, at 15-50; Clark, supra note 9, at 695-98.
26. Clark, supra note 9, at 695-98.
27. In England this requirement was satisfied if lettres of requete were sent
out under the Privy Seal and disregarded. Clark, supra note 9, at 695-98. See also
E. COLBERT, supra note 20, at 18, 42; Note, supra note 12, at 108.
28. See E. COLBERT, supra note 20, at 36; Clark, supra note 9, at 697; Maccoby,
supra note 15, at 63.
29. Clark, supra note 9, at 697-98.
30. Id. at 698.
31. See generally II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 138-39; 7 J. MOORE'S
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (1906) ; Maccoby, supra note 15, at 63.
32. Maccoby, supra note 15, at 61, 63.
33. Id. at 63 n.5. Spain and Scotland entered such a treaty in 1550; and Spain
and France in 1489. Clark, supra note 9, at 709-11.
34. E. COLBERT, supra note 20, at 47, 51.
35. Professor Oppenheim claims that this practice by which states had in-
dividuals undertake reprisals in their behalf occurred in the eighteenth century; Mr.
Maccoby states that this practice occurred in the seventeenth century. Compare
II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 139, with Maccoby, supra note 15, at 64.
36. See pp. 276-77 infra.
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chants to facilitate and expand trade. Hence, there were fewer incidents
of piracy on European waters.37 By the end of the eighteenth century,
private reprisals were no longer recognized as a lawful sanction within
the international arena. 8
Underlying medieval reprisals were several assumptions. The first
such assumption was that the sovereign of an aggrieved national was
obliged to make a remedy available,8 9 often in the form of permission
to commit a reprisal. Although the sovereign was expected to grant such
permission, he carefully controlled the amount and kind of force that
was employed. The second assumption underlying these private reprisals
was that the entire population of a state was deemed responsible for the
acts of any of its citizens. An injury inflicted by a national of a state
was deemed to have been committed by that state.40 The third assump-
tion was that if the reprisal were preceded by the three requirements of
customary international law - a prior illegal act, an identifiable guilty
party, and a failure to obtain redress - then the reprisal was recognized
as a legal act.41 Notwithstanding the importance of these assumptions,
it is submitted that the critical aspect of these early reprisals was that
the amount of force used in retaliation was commensurate with that used
in the provocation. 42 The reason for this proportionality was that sover-
eigns wanted to limit the outbreak of total war, and had the power to
enforce this desire. 48
Throughout the centuries following the Middle Ages there were
numerous instances of state-ordered armed reprisals. In 1740, Frederick
II of Prussia, in retaliation for an alleged illegal arrest in Russia of a
Prussian citizen, Baron de Stackelberg, seized two Russian subjects and
detained them until Stackelberg was released. 44 In 1847, Great Britain
blockaded the coast of Greece and captured several Greek vessels in re-
taliation for the destruction, by Greek citizens and soldiers, of the home
of Don Pacifico, an Englishman living in Athens.4 5 Perhaps the most
famous reprisal was conducted by the colony of German Southwest
Africa in 1914, when it inflicted severe property loss and personal injury
during six different assaults upon the Portugese colony of Angola in
retaliation for a border incident in which three German officials were shot
and two others interned. The incident erupted at the frontier post of
Naulilaa, and was prompted by language difficulties occurring between
37. Maccoby, supra note 15, at 64.
38. Id.
39. E. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONs 284 (6th ed. 1844) ; Clark, supra note 9,
at 698.
40. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 9, at 723.
41. Id.
42. Note, supra note 12, at 114-16.
43. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 9, at 696.
44. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra, note 18, at 140.
45. Id. at 137-38.
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Portugese guards and German officials who were attempting to import
food supplies into German Southwest Africa.
46
For purposes of this Comment, it is not necessary to further detail
the history of public reprisals. International law is more concerned with
broad principles which can be extracted from the customs of states.
47
It is the failure of international law to prescribe principles regarding
armed reprisals during intermediacy on which this Comment focuses.
48
After the inadequacies of customary international law and the United
Nations Charter provisions are highlighted, it will be easier to compre-
hend the need for a new framework for analysis - that of intermediacy.
III. THE CUSTOMARY RULE OF ARMED REPRISALS
Public reprisals are injurious acts of self-help undertaken by one
state against another, the latter having committed an international tort.4 9
For purposes of classification, positive reprisals - overt acts which
would otherwise be illegal,50 are distinguished from negative reprisals -
refusals to perform acts which are ordinarily obligatory. 51 Broadly
stated, the purposes of these retaliatory acts are: (1) to enforce obedi-
ence to international law by discouraging further illegal conduct;52 (2)
to compel a change in policy by the delinquent state;53 and (3) to force
a settlement to a dispute which resulted from a breach of international
law by the delinquent state.54 It must be emphasized that these reprisals
would normally be illegal acts under international law but for the com-
mission of a prior offense which temporarily suspends the operation of
international law until the objective of the reprisal is accomplished. 55
46. W. BISHOP JR., INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 747-48 (2d
ed. 1962); VI G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 154-55 (1943);
L. ORFIELD & E. RE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 902-03 (rev.
ed. 1965) ; G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 1, at 49-50; Lenoff, Reciprocity: The
Legal Aspects of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 630 (1954); McDougal &
Feliciano, Legal Regulation of the Right to Resort to International Coercion, 68
YALE L.J. 1070 n.47 (1958-59).
47. For cases demonstrating the importance of custom as a source of inter-
national law where no other source of law exists, see generally North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases, [1968] I.C.J. 30; Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian
Territory (merits) [1960] I.C.J. 6; The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" [1927] P.C.I.J.,
ser. A, No. 10.
48. It is submitted that there is little, if any, discussion to date addressing the
issue set forth herein; i.e., whether armed reprisals are permissible during inter-
mediacy, and, if they are, the quantity and quality of force that can be employed
by the retaliating state.
49. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 136.
50. Id.; Lenhoff, supra note 46, at 629.
51. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 140.
52. VI G. HACKWORTH, supra note 46, at 152. A reprisal is a legal act of
redress to obtain satisfaction for an injury received after refusal to make redress
has occurred.
53. See Note, supra note 12, at 116.
54. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 136.
55. Lenhoff, supra note 46, at 629.
COMMENTS
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1971], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss2/3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Among the common illustrations5" of such reprisals are embargo, 57 military
occupation,5 8 naval bombardment, 59 boycott,6 0 pacific blockade, 61 and
intervention.6 2 To focus more clearly on the scope of reprisals, it is
helpful to distinguish them from two other related courses of action
retorsions and acts of war.
Retorsions are unfriendly, retaliatory acts undertaken by one state
against another for the purpose of obtaining redress or cessation of
similar offensive, but not illegal acts.63 Typical examples include tighten-
ing of passport restrictions, levying of high protective tariffs not guaran-
teed by treaty, and exclusion of foreigners from certain occupations.6 4
Although retorsions and the acts which precipitate them do not violate
international law, neither do they foster friendly intercourse between
states. The amount of force employed in a retorsion is usually commen-
surate with that used by the provoking state, although in many cases it
is less.65 In addition, international law requires that retorsions cease
when their objective has been accomplished.6 6 In short, retorsions attempt
to persuade rather than coerce. This, however, is not the case with acts
of war which are clearly distinguishable from retorsions and reprisals.
56. See generally II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 137-51.57. VI G. HACKWORTH, supra note 46, at 152. An embargo is a special form
of reprisal whereby the retaliating state seizes public or private property of the
offending nation. G. WILSON, supra note 5, at 245. The term is sometimes used to
refer to detention of ships in port for the purpose of compelling a delinquent to
make reparation for the injury done. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 141.
58. VI G. HACKWORTH, supra note 46, at 152. Military occupation is more than
merely invading another country, it is the temporary taking of another nation's
territory for the purpose of holding it. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 434.59. This is one way a nation may display force to insure observance of its
rights. G. WILSON, supra note 5, at 249-50.
60. Id. at 246-47. Boycotts of trade were frequently undertaken to compel
a foreign state to cease an objectionable policy. The United States in 1809 passed
the Non Intercourse Act against British trade. 2 Stat. 528 (1815).
61. VI G. HACKWORTII, supra note 46, at 152. A pacific blockade is a method
of isolating a country or ports without destroying peaceful relations. G, WILSON,
supra note 5, at 247. It is a peaceful means of compelling a settlement of inter-
national disputes. II L. OPPENHEIM, upra note 18, at 144-45.
62. VI G. HACKWORTH, supra note 46, at 152; II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18,
at 150-51.[Intervention] consists in the dictatorial interference of a third State in adifference between two States, for the purpose of settling the difference in the
way demanded by the intervening State.Id. Intervention may take the form of a communicated dictatorial demand for the
settlement of a dispute. Id. It may also take the form of interference by force.Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-Defence, 1961 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 187 (1962).
63. Lenhoff, supra note 46, at 629. The purpose of retorsions is to induce
another state to change its actions or policies which, although not illegal under inter-
national law, are undesirable. Id. The acts in response to which the retorsions are
made are unfriendly or discourteous but are not international delinquencies. W.
FRIEDMANN & 0. LIssITZYq, supra note 1, at 880; II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18,
at 134, 136; L. ORFIELD & E. RE, supra note 46, at 909. Like reprisals, retorsions are
not considered acts of war. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 132.
64. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 134; G. WILSON, supra note 5, at 244.
65. Nor does the retorsion have to be the same kind of act as that of theprovoking act, although it usually is similar. See II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18,
at 135; G. WILSON, supra note 5, at 243.
66. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 135.
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The purpose of an act of war is to overpower the target state so
that the victor may impose the conditions that it pleases.6 7 From this,
it follows that there is no requirement of proportionality in the amount
of force which may be used;68 nor is there a rule that the aggression
must cease when the target state alters its conduct to conform to the
wishes of the responding state.6 9 The primary requisite for an act of
war, further distinguishing it from other forceful measures, is the forma-
tion of an animus belligerendi by either the offending or responding
state.70  It is precisely this intent to go to war that reprisals seek to
prevent. 71 Thus, stated graphically, reprisals fall somewhere between
retorsions and acts of war with respect to the intent to inflict injury, the
intensity of the force actually employed, and the risk of initiating more
violent hostilities.72
This area between retorsions and acts of war cannot remain un-
explored and undefined for the present-day potential to enter into full
scale hostilities is too great. To better understand the nature of an armed
reprisal, it is necessary to go beyond the above definition and understand
the customary rule of international law with respect to such an act of
force. Once again, the purpose of explaining the customary rule is to
test its adequacy for analysis of contemporary international problems.
67. Id. at 202. The ultimate objective of a war could be viewed in two respects,
politically or militarily:
(1) From the political point of view, the object is to obtain the end of a state.
(2) From the military point of view, the object is to secure the submission
of the enemy.
G. WILSON, supra note 5, at 255.
68. See text accompanying notes 102-08 infra. Any amount and any kind of
force can be implemented in order to compel another state to settle the differences.
II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 133.
69. Id. Unlike retorsions and reprisals, the warring state is not required to
cease the belligerent activity when a state has been compelled to conform to the
desires of the victorious state. It may impose any conditions upon the vanquished
state. Id.
70. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 98(1961). Professor Kelsen disagrees, feeling that to fulfill the requirement for a
"legal status of war" the intent to go to war is not enough; the actual use of
armed force is also required:
A state of war in the true and full sense of the term is brought about only by
acts of war, that is to say, by the use of armed force; and only such a state
may be, but need not necessarily be, terminated by a peace treaty. Conse-
quently war is a specific action, not a status. From the point of view of
international law, the most important fact is the resort to war, and that means
resort to an action, not resort to a status. Some writers consider the intention
to make war, the animus belligerendi, of the state or states involved in war as
essential. Animus belligerendi means the intention to wage war. But this can
only be the intention to perform acts of war, that is to say, to use armed force,
with all the consequences international law attaches to the use of armed force.
H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (1952).
71. See H. KELSEN, supra note 70, at 27.
72. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 202.
Unilateral acts of force performed by one State against another without a previous
declaration of war may be a cause of the outbreak of war, but are not war in
themselves, so long as they are not answered by similar hostile acts by the other
side. . . . Thus it comes about . . . acts of force performed by one State
against another by way of reprisal . . . are not necessarily acts initiating war.
Id. at 202-03.
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A. Armed Reprisals During Peacetime Under
the Customary Rule
Customary international law prescribes two prerequisites that must
be satisfied before an armed reprisal can be perpetrated during peacetime.
The first prerequisite is a prior violation of international law78 which by
nature involves an interference with more than trivial rights or interests
of the aggrieved state.7 4 An international delinquency 75 occurs when any
one or more of the following has been violated: (1) an international
convention recognized by the opposing states;761 (2) a customary rule
of international law applicable to the states involved;77 (3) a principle
recognized by civilized nations;78 (4) a decision of an international
tribunal to which both states were consenting parties ;79 or (5) a bilateral
treaty binding on both states.80 The only issue raised by this first re-
quirement is whether there has in fact been a breach of international law.
The analysis would simply involve an examination of the five criteria to
decide if any one or more of them were satisfied. In short, there must
be a prior illegal act to justify an armed reprisal.
Given that such an act occurs, the second prerequisite for legitimiza-
tion of an armed reprisal is the absence of redress; that is, an unsuccess-
ful demand by the injured state upon the offending state for cessation of
the illegality or for redress or both.8 ' The purpose of this requirement
is to delay the use of force until all avenues of achieving a peaceful
solution are exhausted. 82 Examples might include negotiation,8 3 arbitra-
73. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 137; Falk, supra note 9, at 430; Note,
supra note 12, at 109. Whether or not an act is illegal may depend upon the existence
of war or peace since reprisals are acceptable and allowable under customary inter-
national law only if the requirements of peace time or war time reprisals are fulfilled.
See II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 143.
74. Note, supra note 12, at 114-15. Not every injurious act gives rise to a provo-
cation. An act of a state injurious to another state is nevertheless not an international
delinquency if committed neither wilfully and maliciously nor with culpable negligence.
Therefore, an act of a state committed by right, or prompted by self-preservation in
necessary self-defense, does not constitute an international delinquency, howeverinjurious it may be to another state. I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 311
(7th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1948).
75. A delinquency involves the violation by a state of an internationally recog-
nized duty. I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, at 307. It should be distinguished
from discourteous or unfriendly acts since they "are not illegal and therefore not
delinquent acts." Id.
76. Id. at 311-12. For example, the Hague Convention of 1907 prohibits the use
of armed force to recover contract debts or loans from other states. Id.
77. Id. at 313-14. Some rights that a state enjoys are derived from international
law. For example, generally a state has a duty to refrain from restricting the flow
of a river to other states. While a state has the right to use the river and is technically
acting within its legal rights it may incur liability because its use was arbitrary. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 320.
80. Id. at 307.
81. See E. COLBERT, supra note 20, at 72; II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18,
at 142; Falk, supra note 9, at 430; Note, supru note 12, at 113.
82. See Note, supra note 12, at 113.
83. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 136.
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tion,84 good offices,85 conciliation," inquiry,87 or any other amicable
means.8 8 Ideally, one or more of these are used prior to any retaliatory
action so that a peaceful settlement may be reached. Even if the reprisal
does occur, the time delay may render it milder than it would have been
were it spontaneous. Specifically, the demand for redress involves three
steps. The first entails informing the offending state of the wrong that it
has perpetrated against the one aggrieved.89 Such a communication will
probably include a demand for redress.90 The second step is the passage
of a reasonable time during which the alleged wrongdoer is expected to
answer.9 While there is no binding rule as to what is a reasonable time,
it should depend upon the severity of the injury, prior relations between
the states involved, their geographic location with respect to each other,
and the practice of other states in like situations.9 2 In all likelihood, the
decision as to what is a reasonable time will be made by the state seeking
redress. The third step in satisfying the "no redress" requirement in-
volves refusal or neglect by the offending state to make the requested
reparations. 3 Thus, if there is a proper communication to the provoking
state, and the passage of a reasonable time within which no redress is
made, the second requirement is satisfied. Combined with the first prere-
quisite of a prior illegal act, justifiable grounds for reprisal exist at
this juncture.
Having established that an armed reprisal may legally be undertaken,
customary international law then sets forth the manner in which the
reprisal must be conducted. This involves two facets: (1) the target of
the reprisal must be appropriate; and (2) the quantity and quality of force
used must be within certain limits.
84. Westlake, Reprisals and War, 25 L.Q.R. 127, 135-37 (1909). It has been
proposed that no reprisal should be undertaken against any state unless it refuses or
neglects to reply to an offer of arbitration, or, after accepting arbitration, refuses to
abide by the award. Id. at 136-37.
85. A state is said to offer "good offices" to another state when it tries to induce
the disputing parties to negotiate between themselves, and to "mediate" when it enters
the negotiations itself, but clearly each process merges with the other. J. BRIERY,
THE LAW OF NATIONs 373-76 (6th ed. 1963), cited in W. FRIEDMANN & 0. LisSITZYN,
supra note 1, at 246; II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 9-10.
86. Conciliation is the process of settling a dispute by referring it to a com-
mission of persons whose task it is to uncover the facts and make proposals for a
settlement without having the binding character of an award or judgment. J. BRlERLY,
supra note 85, at 373-76, cited in W. FRIEDMANN & 0. LiSSITZYN, supra note 1, at
248; II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 12-13.
87. Inquiry as a peaceful means of settling disputes is usually achieved by
agreements which give to a commission the power to find facts and clarify issues
in dispute. The famous Bryan Treaties are an example. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra
note 18, at 7.
88. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 136.
89. E. COLBERT, supra note 20, at 72, 75; II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18,
at 142; Note, supra note 12, at 109.
90. Note, supra note 12, at 113.
91. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 142-43; Note, supra note 12, at 113.
92. See generally Blum, The Beirut Raid and the International Double Standard,
64 AM. J. INT'L L. 73, 87-89 (1970); Clark, supra note 9, at 695-96; Falk, supra
note 9, at 431-35; Note, supra note 12, at 113-14.
93. Cf. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 142-43.
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With respect to the first facet, the reprisal must be undertaken only
against the entity responsible for the provocation. 94 If the delinquency
does not officially originate from the government, but rather from the
territory which the government controls, the question arises whether
responsibility can be imputed to the government. Phrased differently,
there is a question of whether or not the person or persons who commit
the original breach of international law can be considered agents of the
government so that their acts are deemed to be the acts of the govern-
ment.95 It is well settled that a state is liable for the activities of its
nationals if it is capable of exercising control over them. This vicarious
liability of the state flows from a well recognized duty upon the state to
exercise reasonable care to prevent illegal acts emanating from its, terri-
tory. If such acts do occur, the state has a further responsibility to
either punish the wrongdoers or compel them to make retribution. 6
Whether those individuals comply with their government's demand has
no significance for purposes of international law since they are not legal
"tpersons" in international law.9 7 The conclusion to be drawn then is that
states are responsible for the acts of their nationals if they (the states)
knew or should have known of these activities and did not act to sup-
press them.9 8 If the state is responsible, anyone or anything belonging
to it may, with two exceptions, be the target of a reprisal 9 Individuals
of the delinquent state living abroad'0 0 and public debts owed by the
state are not considered permissible targets for reprisal.1° 1
The second question with respect to the conduct of the actual reprisal
involves the amount of force employed by the retaliating state. Generally,
international law requires that the amount of force used during the
reprisal must be proportional to that used during the provocation.,0 2
However, this rule presents a major problem since proportionality is sub-
ject to at least four interpretations. 1 8 The traditional view, an outgrowth
of the law of private reprisals, is that the amount of damage inflicted
94. Falk, supra note 9, at 431 ; Note, supra note 12, at 109.
95. See I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, at 330-31; Note, supra note 12, at 110-11.
96. I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, at 238-39; Note, supra note 12, at 111.
97. For a discussion of what entities are considered "legal persons" in international
law, see W. FRIEDMANN & 0. LIssTZYN, supra note 1, at 201-25.
98. See Note, supra note 12, at 110-11.
. 99. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 139-40.
Ships sailing under its flag may be seized, treaties concluded with it may be
suspended, part of its territory may be militarily occupied, goods belonging to it,
or to its citizens, may be seized, and the like.
Id. at 139.
100. Id. at 140. This exception appears to apply strictly to "individuals enjoying
privilege of extraterritoriality while abroad such as heads of states and diplomatic
envoys." Id.,
101. Id. It is generally felt that public debts of a country are not appropriate
objects of reprisal.
102. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 141; Note, supra note 12, at 114. Pro-
portionality, as it is used in this Comment, is a term of art; it means a one-for-one
relationship. This is contrary to its usual dictionary meaning which connotes any
ratio, percentage or comparison.
103. Note, supra note 12, at 114-16.
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during the response may not exceed the amount of damage inflicted
during the initial injury.104 This view probably represents the most
widely accepted international law rule. The second interpretation of
proportionality suggests that the reprisal should not offend the norms
of civilized society and should evidence a high regard for human exist-
ence. 10 5 This interpretation seems to allow a disproportionate response
with respect to the destruction of property so long as the reprisal is under-
taken with regard for the lives of the citizens of the victim state. A
third view of proportionality posits that the amount of force used in a
reprisal should be less than that which would risk a full scale conflict.10 8
This view, like the preceding one, does not require strict proportionality.
The only consideration is whether the reprisal would precipitate a war.
While this permits a more flexible response by an aggrieved state, it
also must be deemed unsatisfactory since it imposes no guidelines as to
what amount of force international law should tolerate.10 7 The fourth
interpretation of proportionality requires that the responding state em-
ploy only that amount of force that is necessary to accomplish its
objective. s08 Again, like the second and third views, this may or may
not call for a strictly proportional response. If, in implementing a reprisal,
a state uses more force than necessary to accomplish its objective, then
the reprisal fails this particular test and is illegal. Whether the reprisal
is legal, therefore, depends upon which of the four interpretations is used.
Two additional requirements pertaining to the amount of force
employed during a reprisal must be noted. One is that the reprisal must
cease immediately upon reparation by the delinquent state.' 09 The second
is that a state, in conducting a reprisal, must not unreasonably interfere
with the rights of third-party states." 0 The effect of these two limita-
tions is to place armed reprisals within certain boundaries beyond which
they would be illegal and unjustifiable.
104. Falk, supra note 9, at 431. One authority cited for this "dollar-for-dollar,
death-for-death" approach is the holding of the Special Arbitration Panel (Portugal-
Germany) in the Naulilaa case. Although there is contrary authority which contends
that Naulilaa does not stand for a strict proportionality rule, it at least stands for
the proposition that reprisals must be in approximate proportion to the offense, and
certainly cannot, in any case, be totally out of proportion to the acts which precipitate
them. 8 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 409 (1928). The tribunal stated, inter alia, that the
German aggression of October, November, and December, 1920, namely, attacking and
destroying forts in Angola, lacked proportionality when compared to the killing of
two German offlicals and internment of two others during a border incident. Id. at 422.
See also VI G. HACKWORTH, supra note 46, at 154-55.
105. Note, supra note 12, at 114. See also Venezia, La Notion de Represenailles
en Droit International Public, 44 REV. GEN. DROIT INTL PUB. 465, 487 (1960).
106. Note, supra note 12, at 114; Venezia, supra note 105, at 487.
107. This view would seem to permit an excessive amount of force to be used
in response to a relatively minor infraction as long as war does not result. This
results in placing little if any practicable limitation on the amount of force allowed
in an armed reprisal.
108. Brownlie, supra note 62, at 231-32; Note, supra note 12, at 114.
109. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 143.
110. See generally, II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 673-766.
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B. Armed Reprisals During Wartime Under
the Customary Rule
The purpose of armed reprisals during wartime is to compel obedi-
ence to the laws of war."' Concomitantly, the duty of a warring nation
to obey the laws of war depends upon whether the enemy adheres to
similar conduct. If a nation violates the laws of war, the injured nation
is justified in conducting a reprisal to compel the offending nation to
refrain from such illegal acts. While proportionality is usually set forth
as a requirement of a wartime reprisal," 2 international law does permit
the response to be different in kind from the provocation."x 3 Whereas
in medieval times a seizure of goods was answered by a seizure of
goods, such a requirement does not inure to the rules for armed reprisals
during wartime. In reality, neither proportionality nor the similarity of
the acts is the problem of wartime reprisals. The crux of the difficulty
with respect to these reprisals is that their purpose will rarely, if ever,
be accomplished, since no belligerent state is likely to accede to a request
to cease illegal activities. Nor is it likely that a belligerent would com-
pensate the injured state with which it is at war." 4 One last, unrelated
aspect of wartime reprisals, further distinguishing them from those
committed during peacetime, is the lack of concern that such reprisals
may substantially interfere with the rights of neutrals." 5  In the final
analysis, while international law addresses the problem of wartime re-
prisals, it is not as significant a concept as that of peacetime reprisals
since states at war will be more concerned with their own national in-
terests than with adherence to law.
IV. THE FAILURE OF THE CUSTOMARY RULE
It is submitted that the customary rule, pertaining to both war and
peace, is inadequate to analyze armed reprisals during intermediacy. 116
The wartime reprisal rule is not applicable to intermediacy situations in
general, and to the Beirut incident in particular, because neither Israel
nor Lebanon had the requisite animus belligerendin 7 to properly label
their relationship one of war.' 8 Since the customary rule of peacetime
111. The purpose of wartime retaliation is to force the other belligerent state to
cease its illegal action and to equalize the position of the opposing nations by
releasing one from adherence to the law which the other has violated. E. COLBERT,
supra note 20, at 2; II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 143; J. STONE, LEGAL
CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 354 (2d ed. 1959).
112. During the Second World War one example of a truly proportionate reprisal
occurred. In response to the alleged binding and chaining of German prisoners taken
in the Dieppe raid, Germany treated four thousand British prisoners in like manner.
J. STONE, supra note 111, at 354 n.32.
113. Id. at 354-55.
114. Id. at 356.
115. Id. at 366.
116. See note 3 supra.
117. See note 71 supra.
118. See note 183 infra.
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reprisals is used to analyze retaliations short of war, focus should be
directed to those aspects of the peacetime rule which break down when
applied to status mixtus. Those aspects concern: (1) the culpability of a
government for a non-governmentally implemented provocation; (2) the
necessity of requesting redress, and waiting a reasonable time before re-
sponding; and (3) the proportionality of the response. Examination of
these three criteria demonstrates that the customary rule is too rigid to
resolve the question whether international law should permit reprisals
during intermediacy 1 9 and, if permitted, what the limits of such a re-
sponse should be.
A. Culpability
Addressing the question of a state's responsibility for a non-govern-
mentally directed provocation, it must first be recognized that guerrilla
warfare has become a means adopted by many national liberation groups
to overthrow governments which they believe to be illegal or oppressive.' 20
Any inquiry, then, to be relevant to present day conditions, must focus
upon whether responsibility for guerrilla attacks upon a neighboring
state can be ascribed to the government which purports to be the inter-
national representative of those who committed the alleged international
tort. Briefly stated, responsibility is a function of support. If support
short of overt military or financial assistance does not render a state
responsible, then Lebanon escapes liability in the present example even
though (1) it permitted the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(the "Popular Front") to recruit and train commandos from refugee
camps located within Lebanon;121 (2) it made available mass media
through which propaganda was disseminated; and (3) it publicly ap-
plauded the Athens raid' 22 executed by those same guerrilla forces.
One recent discussion of the customary rule concluded that Lebanon
was not responsible for the Athens raid since the link between the
Lebanese Government and the Popular Front operating within its terri-
tory was too weak to impute liability to the former.123 Thus, according
119. In recent years there have been other international relationships that might
conceivably be labeled status mixtus: North and South Korea, East and West
Germany, China and Formosa, India and Pakistan, Nigeria and Biafra, the Soviet
Union and China.
120. See generally R. DEBRAY, REVOLUTION IN THE REVOLUTION? 19 (B. Ortiz
transl. 1967) ; Ho CHI MINH ON REVOLUTION 224 (B. Fall ed. 1967).
121. There is indication that all of these activities were permitted by the
Lebanese Government. See note 209 infra.
122. See Falk, supra note 9, at 420-21; note 210 infra.
123. Professor Falk concluded that the necessary link between the delinquency
which precipitates the reprisal and the state from which it emanates was not present
in the Athens provocation, and, therefore, Lebanon was not culpable. Falk, supra
note 9, at 439. That conclusion is accepted here for the purpose of demonstrating
that the customary rule is inadequate. If Professor Falk is correct then the analysis set
forth follows logically. If professor Falk is mistaken and the necessary link was
present fulfilling this element of the customary rule, the other elements attacked as
inadequate are still present. Admittedly, the conclusion of Professor Falk is the
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to that commentary, the customary peacetime rule imposes no legal obliga-
tion on a state to prevent guerrillas from committing extraterritorial acts
of aggression, notwithstanding the failure of the government to intervene
once it learned that an international delinquency was initiated from
within its borders. Furthermore, it was found that the customary rule
does not require the state to take steps necessary to prevent future delin-
quencies; only where the government overtly and directly supports the
guerrillas, so as to make them agents of the government, will culpability
inure to the state under the customary rule. However, during inter-
mediacy, when states differ fundamentally over deep-rooted issues, 12 4 a
greater, not lesser, responsibility to control subversive elements should be
imposed. Only then is there a chance of preventing more open and
violent hostility. It should be noted that in the months following the
Beirut raid, Lebanon took measures which, in fact, effectively controlled
guerrilla activity. This indicates that the Lebanese Government probably
had the capacity to so limit this subversive activity before the Athens
raid. The conclusion that Lebanon had no duty to restrain the activities
of the Popular Front, and was therefore not responsible for these
activities, does not help structure expectations or reduce tensions between
the states involved.
B. Request for Redress
The second aspect of the customary rule which poses serious obstacles
to analyzing armed reprisals during status mixtus is the prohibition
against an immediate response. As already noted, the customary rule
requires the retaliating state to request redress and to wait a reasonable
time during which the offending state may, and hopefully will, satisfy
the request. It is submitted that such a request in the Middle East status
mixtus would be futile, since there the provocations consisted of re-
peated acts; i.e., the continuous interference with Israeli air traffic. Such
prior conduct would make it impracticable to require Israel to stand idly
by and await further acts of provocation while presumably making
diplomatic overtures. It was clear that there would be nothing gained by
requesting redress. Evaluated realistically, even minor frictions between
quasi-belligerent states may not be amenable to settlement by diplomatic
gestures since requests for redress are not likely to be granted by a state
which is in a status mixtus with the requesting state.125 Therefore, dur-
ing intermediacy a state should be allowed to respond to an international
tort immediately, without perfunctorily awaiting redress which no one
same drawn herein - that a nexus did not exist between the breach of internationallaw by the Popular Front and the government of Lebanon. Even if that conclusion is
rejected, the inadequacy of the customary rule is proved.
124. See Jessup, supra note 3.
125. In an intermediacy situation, the fundamental issues that divide the nations
pervade most of the ancillary issues. Id.
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seriously, considers will be forthcoming. In the context of the Beirut
raid, Israel did not comply with the customary rule, but to hold it to such
a standard does not comport with the realities of the situation.
C. Proportionality
The third aspect of the customary rule of reprisal which fails in a
status mixtus situation is proportionality. Assuming, arguendo, that the
traditional view of proportionality is that the injury inflicted during both
the provocation and the retaliation must be equal or nearly equal, 126 then
the Beirut reprisal would be inconsistent with international law since
the destruction of $43.8 million worth of property was certainly not
equal to the destruction of one El Al airplane and the killing of one Israeli
national.12 7 Yet, the use of a lesser amount of force would not have
effectively deterred future acts of aggression - one object of a reprisal
during status mixtus. The paradox is that a state acts illegally under the
customary rule of armed reprisals, and yet, is forced to do so in order
to accomplish its objective - the cessation of provoking acts in the future.
Those provoking acts in the instant example were the work of not only
Lebanese commandos but of other forces operating in the Arab sphere.
It is submitted that due to the exigencies of the situation, international
law should permit a greater quantum of force to be used during inter-
mediacy than during peacetime. During intermediacy, hostility is more
commonplace and becomes part of a state's expectations. Therefore, to
induce a quasi-belligerent state to alter its course of conduct, it is neces-
sary to use an amount of force which will exceed the target state's
expectation of normal hostility, and impress upon it the determination
of the responding state not to tolerate similar acts in the future. Hence,
the traditional view of proportionality is too restrictive, and a broader,
more pragmatic standard is needed.
If any of the other three views of proportionality are used, although
probably not representative of the customary proportionality formulation,
then a more forceful retaliation would be rendered legitimate, and this
element of the traditional rule would be satisfied, although measured by
another yardstick.128 In the final analysis, the three critical requirements
126. This test apparently was applied by one commentator in viewing the Beirut
raid as disproportionate. Falk, supra note 9, at 433, 439-40. But see Note, supra note
12, at 114-16 (All four meanings of proportionality as outlined in the text, pp. 282-83
supra, must be considered in the test for proportionality. Note, supra note 12, at 115).
127. Falk, supra note 9, at 416, 439. According to Professor Falk, "[The Beirut
attack] involved the destruction of what appeared to involve an excessive amount of
property in an unusually spectacular and inflammatory fashion . . . ." This statement
is unpersuasive because there has not yet been suggested a satisfactory method of
putting a value on one man's life. It is not logical to compare the loss of one life
with the destruction of one inanimate airplane, or even thirteen.
The objects of the Beirut raid were to alter the policies of all the Arab
states and to induce them to deprive the guerrilla groups of their sanctuaries. See Falk,
supra note 9, at 437-38 n.61.
128. A discussion of these other views is set forth in section III of this Comment.
See pp. 277-84 infra.
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of the customary rule of armed reprisals - a culpable state, an unsuc-
cessful demand for redress and a proportional reprisal - would not be
satisfied in a factual setting which, as demonstrated, would resist that
conclusion. However, as set forth above, the customary rule is totally
inadequate when used to gauge states' actions during status mixtus.
V. ARMED REPRISALS UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
Having examined the right of armed reprisal under the customary
rule of international law, the next phase of analysis is to ascertain
whether and to what extent the United Nations Charter has limited or
abolished that right. It must be understood initially that the Charter
attempted to create a structure for the peaceful settlement of international
disputes. Toward this end, Article 2 of the Charter states in pertinent part:
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes
stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following principles.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peace-
fil means in such a manner that international peace and security,
and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State, or in any other manner incon-
sistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 12 9
The purposes of the United Nations to which the above provision makes
reference include: the maintenance of international peace and security;
the development of friendly relations between states; the achievement of
international cooperation in solving economic, cultural, social and humani-
tarian problems; and, the creation of a center for harmonizing the actions
of states to attain these ends. 3 0 While these objectives are relevant to
the interpretation of the applicable Charter provisions, they should not be
read as limiting the conduct of a state to the extent that the state's exist-
ence is threatened. Certainly, no discussion of armed reprisals can bypass
the United Nations Charter; while the Charter is essential to our under-
standing of the right to implement such actions, it should not function as
a straight-jacket to analysis.
The Charter makes no mention of armed reprisals. Therefore, to
decide whether such acts are legal it is necessary to examine its pro-
visions concerning self-defense, since that is the only use of force
expressly allowed. In addition to Article 2, cited above, Article 51 sets
forth the right of a state to use force in its own defense:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
129. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3, 4.
130. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
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against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by the Members in the exercise of the right
of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of
the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary to maintain or restore peace
and security.' 3
The combined effect of Articles 2(3), 2(4) and 51, according to most
commentators, 13 2 is to render all use of force, except collective or in-
dividual self-defense, illegal.' 33 Under such an interpretation, the viability
of the customary right of armed reprisals is highly questionable. Even
the right of self-defense is circumscribed by requiring that an actual
armed attack occur before such a right inures to the injured state. It
further follows from this restrictive reading that the use of force in
anticipation of an imminent attack is precluded, since an armed attack
would not have preceded the prophylactic reaction of the threatened state.
Opponents of this literal interpretation have advanced several cogent
arguments ;134 after their exposition, they will be applied to the context
131. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
132. H. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 964 (2d ed. 1952); L. GOODRICH & E.
HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 104 (2d ed. 1949); P. JESSUP, A MODERN
LAW OF NATIONS 172 (1956); H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 269
(1951); II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 49, at 153-54; Wright, The Outlawry of
War and the Law of War, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 365, 370 (1953).
133. Brownlie, supra note 62, at 232-33. See also II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18,
at 156.
[T]he Charter confines the right of armed self defense to the case of an armed
attack as distinguished from various forms of unfriendly conduct falling short of
an armed attack.
Id.
134. See, e.g., Brownlie, supra note 62, at 236. One commentator postulates that
Article 2(4) leaves the traditional right of self-defense unimpaired; it extends to
protect the existence of a state, its citizens and their property. It does not depend
upon the occurrence of an armed attack upon the sovereign state. D. BOWETT, SELF-
DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 185-86 (1958).
Concerning other means of self-help Bowett writes:
The prohibition of the individual state's right to use or threaten force, coupled
with the delegation to the Security Council of primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, and the agreement of individual
members to accept the Council's decision brings about a situation in which self
help may be prohibited whilst self-defense remains under Article 51.
Id. at 11.
The traditional international law rule concerning self-defense was expressed
in the Caroline case. That case arose from the Canadian insurrection of 1837.
The insurgents in Canada were receiving supplies from sympathizers on the American
side of the border. The Caroline was a small steamship used by Americans at Buffalo
and Black Rock, both on the American side. On December 29, 1837, while moored
at Schlosser, also on the American side, with thirty-three Americans on board, the
Caroline was attacked, destroyed by fire and set adrift over Niagara Falls. One
American was killed, several were wounded, and only 23 of the 33 on board were
accounted for. In 1841, an alleged participant in the raid, Alexander McLeod, was
arrested and detained in New York. Lord Palmerston, as spokesman for the
Canadian government, claimed responsibility for the incident, and justified it as a public
act of force in self-defense by persons in the British service. In 1842, the two
governments agreed on the principle that the requirements of self-defense might
necessitate the use of force, but Secretary of State Webster stated that the necessity
did not exist in this case. In a letter from Secretary Webster dated April 24, 1841,
20
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of the Beirut raid to determine the ability of the United Nations Charter
to deal effectively with reprisals during intermediacy.
It may be argued initially that each nation possesses an inherent
right of self-defense which arises from natural law. 18 5 That this right
is inherent is expressly stated in Article 51. In essence, a state, simply
because it is a state, has the right to take those measures it deems essen-
tial to its own preservation. Self-defense as a natural right is justified
when certain national interests are threatened,'1 36 peaceful settlement of
a dispute is impossible,8 7 and the immediate use of force is absolutely
necessary to maintain the status quo.1 8  Examples of vital national in-
terests which warrant the use of force in self-defense include an inter-
ference with the territorial integrity of a state1 39 or a threat to the lives
of its nationals at home or abroad.1 40  Additionally, a nation possesses
the inherent right to protect its existence from threats that do not violate
its territorial integrity.' 4' The assistance of subversive elements within
to Mr. Fox, the British Minister at Washington, which was later incorporated into
a note to Lord Ashburton of Great Britain, he said that Great Britain must show:[N]ecessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to show, also, that the local
authorities of Canada, even supposing the necessity of the moment authorizedthem to enter the territories of the United States at all, did nothing unreasonable
or excessive; since the act justified by the necessity of self-defence, must belimited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.This suggests that an actual undertaking must be in the offing in order to makethe act of self-defense immediately necessary. See generally W. FRIEDMANN & 0.LiSSITZYN, supra note 1, at 882; Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938) ; Note, supra note 12, at 119.The action taken here is really that of anticipatory self-defense. There are
other examples where the right of anticipatory self-defense was exercised against
armed bands operating from a neighboring territory. See Brownlie, InternationalLaw and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 712 (1958).
135. D. BowErr, supra note 134, at 4.136. The question which follows is which interests must be threatened so as to
allow self-defense.
The classical writers, however, failed to offer any guidance on the degree ofinjury necessary to justify resort to force as a matter of self-defense. TheSpanish theorists, generally speaking, limited the right to protection of territory,
nationals, and property, but Vattel extended it to the violation of any rights....
J. STONE, supra note 111, at 339.
137. I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, at 266.
138. Id.; Note, supra note 12, at 119.
139. D. BowETr, supra note 134, at 29-41.140. I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, at 309; Waldock, The Regulation of theUse of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 REc. DES COURs 466-67,503 (1952) ; Note, supra note 12, at 118.141. See D. BOWETT, supra note 134, at 43, 189. It should be recognized thatthe members of the United Nations have not in practice abandoned the right of
anticipatory self-defense. Pakistan justified its invasion and occupation of Kashmir
on the ground that it possessed the inherent right to exercise anticipatory self-defense. There had been in fact no actual attack on Pakistan by India. 5 U.N.SCOR, 464th meeting 7 (1951); U.N. Doc. S/PV464 (1951).The British Government's position on articles 2 and 51 following its involve-
ment in the Arab-Israeli War of 1956, was that Article 51 did not restrict the
customary right of self-defense and that its involvement was justified as a measure
to protect British nationals. Brownlie, supra note 62, at 236.Finally, a number of the East European Treaties of Friendship and MutualAssistance provide for the immediate aid in case of a renewal of aggression byGermany - it has been suggested that they indicate a readiness to resort to
anticipatory self-defense. Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Aid, Poland and Czecho-
slovakia, March 10, 1947, art. 3, 25 U.N.T.S. 365.
,: VOL. 17
21
Salpeter and Waller: Armed Reprisals during Intermediacy - A New Framework for Analysi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1971
DECEMBER 1971]
the threatened state or the use of bacteriological warfare serve as two
examples where the territorial integrity of a state need not necessarily
be violated in order that the existence of the state or its political inde-
pendence be threatened.142 Yet, a strict reading of Article 51 would not
allow the victim of such aggression to forcefully respond.
To posit that the only right of self-defense is that defined by Article
51 is to hold that the United Nations conferred, rather than limited a
natural right. However, it is undisputed that states possessed the in-
herent right of self-defense prior to their entrance into the United
Nations. They possessed all of the natural rights that inure to an entity
known as a state.143 Thus, according to some commentators, the Charter
should be viewed as a limitation,144 not a grant of this natural right of
self-defense. 145 If Article 51 is viewed as such a limitation, then it does
not follow that a state cannot act to protect vital national interests given
certain exigent circumstances. Indeed, it would be a strange conclusion
to say that a state, acting to protect its territorial integrity, political in-
dependence, or the lives of its nationals, is, by so doing, acting contrary
to the purposes of the United Nations. If those purposes include the
maintenance of international peace and security, as is expressly stated in
the Charter, how can a state by protecting those interests mentioned act
inconsistently with the Charter?146
Another impracticality of a literal reading of the Charter is that it
requires that an actual armed attack occur before a state can claim the
right to defend itself.147  It is submitted that given the capability of
142. See D. BowErr, supra note 134, at 192; Brownlie, supra note 62, at 244-45;Kelsen, Collective Security and Collective Self Defense Under the Charter of theUnited Nations, 42 Am. J. INT'L L. 783, 791-92 (1948).
143. See Note, supra note 12, at 117.144. D. BowET, supra note 134, at 185, quoting Goodhart, The North AtlanticTreaty of 1949, 78 REc. DES CouRs 187, 192 (1951).[Tihe members of the United Nations when exercising their inherent powersdo so not by grant but by already existing right. The Charter limits the
sovereign rights of the states; it is not a source of those rights.Id. See also J. STONE, supra note 111, at 234.
It is evident that Article 51 was intended to "safeguard the right ofself-defence not restrict it." D. BOWETT, supra note 134, at 188.145. Kelsen states that Article 51 applies only in the event of an armed attacktherefore no other claim to self-defense may be presented even if the troops arepoised on the borders. H. KELSEN, supra note 132, at 269; J. STONE, supra, note 111,at 244; Wehberg, L'Interdiction der Recours a la Force, 78 Rc. DEs. CouRs 7, 70, 81(1951).146. D. BowETT, supra note 134, at 183. This commentator would permit the
use of self-defense as an anticipatory measure against troops concentrated alongthe frontier. Id. at 244 n.8. See also Brownlie, supra note 63, at 239.147. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 136.The Charter confines the right of armed self-defense to the case of an armed
attack as distinguished from . . .. various forms of unfriendly conduct falling
short of armed attack.
Id.
Another commentator states:But this article applies only in case of an armed attack. The right of self-defense must not be exercised in case of any other violation of the legallyprotected interests of a member.
H. KELSEN, supra note 132, at 269.
COMMENTS
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1971], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss2/3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
modern weaponry, s48 it is unrealistic to expect a state to await an armed
attack before responding with force.149 Such an attack could terminate
the existence of a state. 50 An examination of the Beirut raid within the
framework of the law of the United Nations highlights the unreasonable-
ness of a restrictive reading of the Charter.
VI. THE FAILURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS RULE
An analysis of the Beirut raid under the Charter reveals two possible
conclusions - either armed reprisals are prohibited under the Charter
and the Beirut raid is illegal, or an inherent right of armed reprisal
exists irrespective of the Charter when no peaceful alternative is available.
Focusing on the first possible conclusion, most publicists have suggested
that Article 2 abrogates the right to implement an armed reprisal' 5' since
the only way to achieve a semblance of world order is to outlaw all use
of force 5 2 except the narrowly defined exceptions of Article 51.15 That
all wars, defacto wars, and forceful measures short of war are illegal
under the Charter' 54 seems to have been the official position of the United
Nations when it censored Great Britain for its reprisal against Harib
Yemen on March 28, 1964, in response to Yemeni support of the anti-
colonial struggle in Aden. 15  The rationale of that decision was that the
members of the United Nations contracted with each other not to use
148. See D. BOWETT, supra note 134, at 192.
149. I D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 342 (1965).
150. D. BowETT, supra note 134 at 43.
151. Note, supra note 12, at 127.
152. See McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 46, at 1060. See also D. BOWETT,
supra note 134, at 13, 148; I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE BY STATES 265, 281 (1963) ; C. COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 409(6th rev. ed. 1967); P. JESSUP, supra note 132, at 172-75; H. KELSEN, supra note
132, at 269; L. KoTzSCH, THE CONCEPT OF WAR IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 270 (1956); II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 153; C. DE
VIGSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 289 (P. Corbett
transl. 1957) ; Falk, supra note 9, at 428; Hsu Mo, The Sanctions of International Law,
35 GROT. Soc'Y 4, 8 (1949) ; Waldock, supra note 140, at 492; Wright, Intervention,
1956, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 272 (1957) ; Wright, supra note 132 at 365, 370.
The only judicial decision under Article 51 is the Corfu Channel case which
did not read the provisions of that Article so narrowly as to preclude the justification
of anticipatory self-defense. Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 42 (individual opinion
of Judge Alvarez) ; Id. at 76-77 (dissenting opinion of Judge Krylov) ; Id. at 108-112
(dissenting opinion of Judge Azevedo).
153. It should be noted that the United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force
in international relations but not in internal affairs. Therefore, the use for force
to quell a civil war would not be prohibited. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 153.
154. 2 G. SCHIWARZENBERGER, supra note 1, at 51 ; J. STONE, supra note 111, at 19.
155. Falk, supra note 9, at 428. U.N. Doc. S/Res/188 (1964). By a 9-0 vote
with two abstentions the Security Council censored Great Britain stating that the
Security Council "condemns reprisals as incompatible with the purposes and principles
of the United Nations." U.N. Doc. S/Res/5650 (1964). This statement seems to
have been the principle that the United Nations has followed concerning armed
reprisals. See Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States U.N. Doc. A/6799
(XXII) (Sept. 26, 1967).
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force to achieve solutions to international controversies; the members,
in relinquishing to the world organization their right to use force, 66
sought to better achieve world order. 15 7
If the Beirut raid is classified as an armed reprisal, it would be illegal
under this rationale irrespective of Lebanon's culpability. 158 This would
be so notwithstanding the possible conclusion that under customary inter-
national law it may have been a lawful response to the Athens provo-
cation.' 59 Under the Charter requirements, Israel failed to follow the
prescribed steps in settling international disputes: (1) peaceful diplomatic
negotiation with Lebanon seeking redress for the injury inflicted by the
guerrilla attack on its property; and (2) that route failing, the forward-
ing of a complaint to the Security Council whose decision would have
been final.' 60 Since Israel failed to take these steps, the Security Council,
following precedent,' 61 was compelled to unanimously condemn Israel
for its attack on the Beirut airport.162
156. See p. 288 supra. Certain methods of coercion were preserved, namely, in-
dividual and collective self-defense. Economic reprisals may also be preserved as a
permissible form of coercion; cf. McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 46, at 1061.
157. Id. at 1063-64.
158. Note, supra note 12, at 127.
159. Falk, supra note 9, at 430 n.39.
As a technical matter, Charter Law is properly accorded priority over in-
consistent rules of customary international law. Therefore, the clear rejection
of the right of reprisal in U.N. practice seems to establish the general authority
of this conclusion in positive international law.Id.
160. Note, supra note 12, at 127. Article 25 of the United Nations Charter
provides:
The members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions
of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.
U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
Article 39 provides the Security Council with the authority to make
decisions.
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
the breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations,
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42,
to maintain or restore international peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
161. See notes 155 supra & 213 infra, which indicate that the Security Council
condemned Israel for its role in the El Samu reprisal and Britain for engaging in
an armed reprisal in Yeden.
162. On December 31, 1968, the Security Council adopted the following resolution
stating that the United Nations:
I. Condemns Israel for its premeditated military action in violation of its
obligations under the Charter and the cease-fire resolutions;
2. Considers that such premeditated acts of violence endanger the maintenance
of peace;
3. Issues a solemn warning to Israel that if such acts were to be repeated, the
Council would have to consider further steps to give effect to its decisions;
4. Considers that Lebanon is entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction
it suffered, repsonsibility for which has been acknowledged by Israel.
U.N. Doc. S/Res/262 (1968).
The statements of the various representatives in the Security Council
demonstrate the unanimous condemnation directed at Israel. See generally U.N. Doc.
S/PV1460 at 7-11 (1968) (statement of Mr. Ghorra of Lebanon), quoted in U.N.
MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Jan. 1969, at 5; U.N. Doc. S/PV1460 at 12 (1968) (statement
COMIMENTS
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Even assuming that the Beirut reprisal was an act of self-defense,
preserved under Article 51, a strict reading of that section would never-
theless lead to the conclusion that Israel acted illegally since one pre-
requisite for a valid exercise of self-defense is the occurrence of an
armed attack.163  While such an exercise of self-defense may on rare
occasions be anticipatory, for example, where an armed attack is immi-
nent, it may not be prophylactic. 1'.  A state may prevent an aggressor
from launching an attack, but it cannot expand the anticipatory attack
beyond this limited purpose. Anticipatory self-defense will not justify
attacking another state now for the purpose of deterring the target state
from all future aggression. It justifies only preventing the implementa-
tion of an imminent aggressive act. For this reason, any attempt to justify
an armed reprisal as a resort to anticipatory self-defense may be as
fruitless as asserting the right to perpetrate an armed reprisal.
If resort to the United Nations is rendered ineffective by reason of
a Security Council veto,'0 5 or because that international organization has
refused to redress similar wrongs in the past, then the state must have a
paramount right to take those steps necessary to protect its existence. 66
of Mr. Rosenne of Israel), quoted in U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Jan. 1969, at 5;
U.N. Doc. S/PV1460 at 13-15 (1968) (statement of Mr. Malik of the Soviet Union),
quoted in U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Jan. 1969, at 5; U.N. Doc. S/PV1460 at 28-30
(1968) (statement of Mr. Wiggins of the United States), quoted in U.N. MONTHLY
CHRONICLE, Jan. 1969, at 6-7; U.N. Doc. S/PV1460 at 32-33 (1968) (statement of
Sir Leslie Glass of Great Britain), quoted in U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Jan. 1969,
at 7-8; U.N. Doc. S/PV1460 at 33-36 (1968) (statement of Mr. Chayet of France),
quoted in U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Jan. 1969, at 8; U.N. Doc. S/PV1460 at
42-46 (1968) (statement of Mr. Parthasarathi of India), quoted in U.N. MONTHLY
CHRONICLE, Jan. 1969, at 9; U.N. Doc. S/PV1460 at 46-51 (1968) (statement of
Mr. Csatorday of Hungary), quoted in U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Jan. 1969, at 9;
U.N. Doc. S/PV1460 at 52-56 (1968) (statement of Mr. Benkaoi of Algeria),
quoted in U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Jan. 1969, at 9-10; U.N. Doc. S/PV1460 at
56-57 (1968) (statement of Mr. M'Bengue of Senegal), quoted in U.N. MONTHLY
CHRONICLE, Jan. 1969, at 10; U:N: Doc. S/PV1460 at 58-60 (1968) (statement of
Mr. Araujo Castro of Brazil), quoted in U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Jan. 1969,
at 10; U.N. Doc. S/PV1460 at 61-62 (1968) (statement of Mr. Ghorra of Lebanon in
reply to the preceding discussion), quoted in U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Jan. 1969,
at 10; U.N. Doc. S/PV1460 at 62-63 (1968) (statement of Mr. Rosenne of Israel in
reply to the preceding discussion), quoted in U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Jan. 1969,
at 10-11.
163. Comment, The Arab Israeli War and International Law, 9 HARV. INT'L L.J.
232, 252 (1968).
164. Id.
165. E. COLBERT, supra note 20, at 203-04; J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD
ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF UNITED NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION 92-101 (1958);
Note, supra note 12, at 128.
166. Note, supra note 12, at 130.
When just and adequate redress is unavailable within the United Nations forum,
then a Member State must have recourse to the traditional principles of self-help
enunciated prior to the United Nations.
Id.
In the Security Council meetings held to discuss the Lebanese charge of
aggression against Israel, Mr. Rosenne of Israel stated:
The feeble excuses which came from Lebanon, from Beirut, will deceive no
objective person. By its tolerance and connivance, Lebanon has once again
ranged itself on the side of defiance of international law. It has thus continued
both by omission and by commission, the policy enunciated by its Prime Minister
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Such a right to self-preservation must be superior to the principles
enunciated in the United Nations Charter. Professor Bowett suggests
this-same idea in stating:
on 16 February 1968. The official position of the Lebanese Government was
then expressed by Mr. Abdalla el-Yaffi in the Lebanese Parliament as follows -
and I am quoting from Radio Beirut: "We remain at war with Israel. Lebanon
will remain faithful to the Khartoum decisions." There is no need for me to
repeat before this Security Council the trinity of negatives that constitutes the
Khartoum decisions.
On 30 April 1968, Abdalla el-Yaffi publicly pledged support to warfare by
terror against Israel. He publicly encourged Lebanese nationals to join terrorist
organizations and promised them arms to fight Israel. That is the declared
policy of the Government of Lebanon.
The Beirut daily Al-Yaum vividly described the official ceremony held on
30 April last when the Prime Minister took leave of fifty Lebanese citizens
who had joined the El-Fatah terror organization, a representative of which
thanked the Lebanese Government for its assistance.
The newspaper Al-Anwar of Beirut, of the same day added that the Prime
Minister spoke enthusiastically in favour of the continuation of warfare by terror
against Israel, and had instructed the Lebanese border guards to facilitate the
movements of El-Fatah units.
To attack Israel is indeed an easy way to gain popularity, and the Arab
leaders do not shun it. On 2 May 1968, the newspaper Al-Sayad reported
extensively on the presence of the Prime Minister of Lebanon at the funeral of
an El-Fatah man who had been killed in action, where armed E1-Fatah men,
dressed in camouflage uniforms and shooting into the air, were seen surrounding
the Prime Minister.
On 8 May 1968, the Lebanese daily Al-Safa reported that "training centres
for Lebanese young men who joined the fedayeen movement have been established
in the town of Sidon." In a statement made on 6 May, the Lebanese Prime
Minister reiterated his Government's support for terrorist warfare. The following
night the first of a series of armed attacks was launched from Lebanese soil
against an Israeli village, Manara.
Since then, the Government of Lebanon has not restrained itself either in
its actions or in its threats against Israel. My delegation reported these and
other incidents to the Security Council in its communications of 14 May 1968
and 15 June 1968. Those notes stressed the grave dangers to the cease-fire
created by these Lebanese provocations.
Those and other warnings were not needed. On 2 November 1968, the
Prime Minister of Lebanon declared to the Kuwait newspaper Ar-Rai Al-Am
that he did not believe in political solutions and that his Government would
support the fedayeen since he considered their activities to be lawful. Later
in the day he received a delegation and, according to Radio Beirut, repeated
that statement. On 2 November 1968, Radio Baghdad quoted the Prime
Minister as saying that what was taken by force would be recovered by force.
On 6 November 1968, the Permanent Representative of Israel forwarded again
a complaint to the Security Council. He wrote:
"I am instructed to stress once more the responsibility of the Lebanese
authorities to ensure scrupulous observance of the cease-fire and to prevent
all armed action against or incursions into Israel from its territory, whether
by regular or irregular forces. When the cease-fire is violated from the
Lebanese side, Israel must reserve the right to take appropriate defensive
measures." (S/8891).
In this very month of December, Lebanon acted as host to an Arab regional
conference, which vowed to continue terror warfare against Israel.
On 24 December 1968, a bare five days ago, the El-Fatah headquarters in
Beirut published a warning to Christian pilgrims that they would be risking their
lives by going to Bethlehem for Christmas. The New York Times of 25
December reported that the Arab terrorists had planned a dramatic act of
violence to disrupt the holiday. According to the newspaper, only the vigilance
of the Israeli defence forces prevented an infamous act of desecration.
The dastardly and murderous outrage of 26 December is thus the culmination
of a long sustained and officially encouraged campaign. All through 1968
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The right of self-defence is common to all systems of law .... As a
legal concept its function and its scope may well vary with the
degree of maturity attained by the system of the law in which it
finds a place. In any immature system of law, where there is absent
any centralized machinery for the enforcement of the law and the
protection of the rights of individuals, or where such machinery is
inefficacious or dilatory in securing those ends, the need to allow to
the individuals whose rights are endangered by a breach of the law
to protect their rights by their own action is obvious.
167
Until the nations of the world obtain meaningful solutions to their
international problems, the United Nations will continue to be little more
than a hope in which few states will place their trust. A state continually
threatened and attacked by terrorist groups supported by belligerent neigh-
boring states has no alternative' 6" but to use force to protect its territorial
Lebanon, turning a deaf ear to Israeli's appeals, has been playing an ever
increasing role in the overall Arab belligerency against Israel. It was in Beirut
that the major Arab terrorist organizations established their headquarters and
set up their international networks. From this safe haven, and taking advantage
of its activities, they mobilized their resources, built up their propaganda
machine, planned and directed their murderous attacks launched against Israel
villages and cities, the acts of sabotage, the planting of mines and boobytraps,
and the hi-jacking of an Israeli airplane last July. They made no secret of their
far-reaching and devilish plots and plans. All this is taking place on Lebanese
soil, in Beirut, the very capital of that country, under the complacent eyes and
ears of the Lebanese authorities. The Government's responsibilities are clearly
established. They are direct responsibilities, not vicarious ones.
The latest tragic and barbaric act in Athens has again brought to the
Lebanese Government the cheap rewards of applause by a public opinion con-
tinuously whipped into senseless and blind hatred. The influential Lebanese
newspaper EI-Nahar, gloating over the murder, wrote on 28 December:
"The homeland of the Palestinian is the entire world - in Jerusalem,
in Tel Aviv, in Los Angeles, in Rome and Athens. One day it will be in
New York, Washington and London. For as long as the Palestinian is
without a homeland, the entire world is his. His home is where the enemy
is. . . . And New York, Washington and London or any other places might
be the scene of the next Palestinian protest operation. The world will sup-
port or condemn, be happy or be afraid."
On 28 December 1968 a commando unit of the Israel defence forces landed
at Beirut airport and struck at a number of aircraft belonging to Arab airlines
parked in the airport. There was no loss of life. Strict precautions were taken,
as far as possible, to avoid damage to non-Arab aircraft. The action was
directed solely against the base from which the terrorists had departed on the
previous occasion.
This action was taken to uphold Israel's basic right to free navigation in
international skies. Its purpose was to show once again that Israel's rights on
land and sea and in the air cannot be jeoparidized [sic] and trampled on with
impunity. It is a reminder to friend and foe of the firm and unconditional
commitment of the people and of the Government of Israel to protect its very
existence, its territory and its lifelines, resolutely and unswervingly.
Without in any belittling the gravity of this terrorist warfare being con-
ducted against Israel's civil aircraft, wherever they might be, the complaint
that we are discussing must also be seen in the broader context of the con-
tinuation by the Arab States, including Lebanon, of active belligerency and
warfare against Israel through the instrumentality of irregular forces and
organizations armed, trained, encouraged and financed by the Arab Governments,
including the Government of Lebanon.
U.N. Doc. S/PV1460 at 17-25 (1968).
167. D. BOWETT, supra note 134, at 3.
168. Falk, supra note 9, at 427.
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integrity and nationals. 16 This was the position taken by Israel when
one of its planes was destroyed and nationals killed during the Athens
provocation. 1'70 The purpose of such terrorist attacks - this was only
one of many - is to continue the war lost in 1967171 and regain the terri-
tory surrendered during that short lived conflict. 172 Israel felt that drastic
measures were necessary to prevent recurrence of aggressive acts aimed
at Israeli air traffic, since resort to the United Nations would not achieve
their cessation. 1'7 3 Israel's attempts to introduce evidence before the
Security Council concerning Lebanon's culpability for the Athens raid were
rebuffed, 174 and the Council unanimously condemned the Beirut raid. 175
However, the fact that the United Nations condemned Israel does not
help answer the vital question raised in this Comment, namely, whether
international law as altered by the United Nations Charter permits a
169. If a state is constantly victimized by aggressive actions, it must utilize a
limited amount of force to protect its existence where it has no other alternative
because:
1. Diplomatic channels are closed because of a tradition of hostility;
2. The United Nations has been ineffective to solve the Arab-Israeli situa-
tion; and
3. The terrorists have avowedly expressed their purpose to be the total
obliteration of Zionists.
Cf. Falk, supra note 9, at 427.
170. See note 12 supra.
171. N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1968, at 2, col. 3. The Arabs are trying to do what
they failed to do in 1967 in the Arab-Israeli war, but this time by committing acts of
aggression against civilians. Id.
172. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 26, col. 2.
173. Blum, supra note 92, at 102-03. Israel's position on why it failed to go
before the United Nations was stated by Foreign Minister Eban:
I am sometimes asked . . . why did we not go to the Security Council after the
Athens attack. Well, I would like to tell you what our decision-making process
is. We did the exercise, we present our complaint. It is considered. It would
have been rejected because they have Algeria and Pakistan and the Soviet Union
and Hungary and even if you did not, you have the [Soviet] veto. What would
be the effect of Israel complaining about her attack on her airlines, complaining
to the highest international organ and being rebuffed? Would this not be inter-
preted as the legitimisation of the attack on the Israeli aircraft in the name of
what is called the Palestine struggle? This is why we didn't go to the Security
Council after the Algerian affair [of the hijacking of an El Ai airliner in July
1968]. Because of the power structure we would have failed and then it would
have been said that the international community approves the kidnapping of
aircraft provided that the reason is the Palestinian reason.
Quoted from Mr. Eban's press conference of Jan. 2, 1969, released by the Israeli
Government Press Office, reproduced in Blum, supra note 92, at 102-03.
174. The Soviet Union refused to consider the Israeli allegations against Lebanon
while at the same time it was condemning Israel for aggression. U.N. Doc. S/PV
1460, at 13-15 (1968) ; U.N. Doc. S/PV1462 at 76 (1968) (remarks of Mr. Malik
of the Soviet Union). Russia took this position despite its own definition of aggres-
sion in article l(f) of the 1954 Russian Draft Definition of Aggression which stated
that an aggressor is any state which offers "[slupport [to] armed bands organized
in its own territory which invade the territory of another [s]tate" or any state
which refuses "on being requested by the invaded [sitate, to take in its own territory
any action within its power to deny such bands any aid or protection." Soviet Draft
Resolution of October 18, 1954, A/C.6/L.332/Rev.1 reproduced in Note, supra note 12,
at 123 n.88. Hungary and Pakistan also objected to the inclusion of the Athens
incident on the Council agenda. U.N. Doc. S/PV1460 at 47 (1968) (remarks of
Mr. Csatorday of Hungary) ; U.N. Doc. S/PV1461 at 37 (1968) (remarks of Mr.
Shahi of Pakistan).
175. See note 162 supra.
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state to undertake an armed reprisal during 'intermediacy. While the
United Nations has itself stated that armed reprisals are prohibited, and
this view is held by many commentators, it is posited that in a status
mixtus, where a nation's vital interests are at stake, the right to conduct
armed reprisals exists.'- Such a right, however, must be limited; an un-
restricted right would lead to the total collapse of the United Nations.'
77
The purpose of the next section is to delineate the scope of this limited
right.
VII. ARMED REPRISALS DURING INTERMEDIACY
The failure of both customary international law and the United
Nations to provide an adequate framework for evaluating armed reprisals
during status mixtus reveals the need for a new standard by which such
retaliatory acts can be judged. It is important to formulate such a standard
by describing how states should act in a status mixtus relationship if
international law is to structure expectations. The standard proposed is
an attempt to confront a problem which international law has not as yet
addressed.'78 The standard is cognizant of the limitations placed upon
the use of force by the United Nations Charter 1 79 since that is the only
existing world organization which could function to enforce international
law and bring a semblance of world order to the international arena. By
enunciating a standard for armed reprisals, it is hoped that states will
be able to determine whether a contemplated armed reprisal would be
176. See D. O'CONNELL, supra note 149, at 338-39.
In considering the extent to which the United Nations Charter today has limited
the scope of self-defence one cannot ignore the effectiveness or otherwise of
international machinery as a substitute for individual action; if the law is ineffec-
tive the primordial right of self-defense must reassert itself.
Id.
Israel's position on the Beirut raid was also expressed by Foreign Minister
Abda Eban when he responded to the question whether Israel would alter its policy
of retaliation because of the international outcry against the inflammatory use of force:
We have no policy of retaliation. We have a policy of survival. If retaliation
helps survival, we are for it. If someone could prove we could survive by giving
Arab violence a free rein, then we would do so. But nobody has proved this.
TimE, Jan. 10, 1969, at 28 (emphasis added).
It is submitted that when the machinery of the United Nations does not
operate effectively to keep the peace under certain restricted instances the customary
right of armed reprisal reasserts itself.
177. The problem with justifying one reprisal is that it raises the same justifica-
tion issue for similar action by other states. International peace is certainly not
fostered if resort to armed reprisals is unfettered by international restrictions. Thus
we will attempt to confine the scope of permissible armed reprisals to an area of
absolute necessity. This Comment also recognizes that armed reprisals should not
be the rule but the exception to the peaceful settlement of international disputes and
should be condemned when and if the United Nations becomes an effective organization.
178. Many contemporary writers have examined the broader question of whether
armed reprisals are permitted under the United Nations Charter or whether the
Charter has effectively precluded them. However, these studies are premised upon
a relationship of peace between nations. Few writers have addressed themselves
to a situation where the reprisal occurs during a state of intermediacy. See generally
Falk, supra note 9.
179. See discussion of the limitations placed upon the use of force by the United
Nations Charter at pp. 288-92 supra.
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consistent with international law. The fundamental premise which per-
vades this analysis is that armed reprisals are an exception to the rule
that force should not be used by a state to settle its disputes. Ineffective
as the United Nations might be,' 80 its goal of peaceful solutions to inter-
national disputes should be the goal of all nations. Therefore, the
standard used to judge the legality of armed reprisals during intermediacy
should preclude the indiscriminate use of force. Yet, to be effective and
realistic, it should be more flexible than the customary rule of peacetime
reprisals. The Beirut raid will again be used as an example in order to
realistically appraise the standard proposed.
By the proposed standard, an armed reprisal during intermediacy
is justified only if all of the following requirements are fulfilled:
A. A status mixtus relationship truly exists between the state which
perpetrates the armed reprisal and the state against which it is directed;
and,
B. The armed reprisal is in response to a provocation which en-
dangers the territorial integrity or the lives of the nationals of the retaliat-
ing state, or in any other way seriously jeopardizes its existence; and,
C. There is evidence indicating to a substantial certainty that a nexus
exists between the provoking act and a government to which responsibility
can be imputed; and,,
D. Recourse to the United Nations has either been exhausted or
would to a high degree of certainty prove ineffective to remedy the injury
that has been inflicted; and,
E. The amount of force employed does not exceed that amount
necessary to accomplish the objective of deterrence, and at the same time
demonstrates a high regard for human life; and,
F. The reprisal is limited to appropriate targets having a reasonable
relation to the deterrent objective.' 8'
A. Intermediacy
Intermediacy is an absolute prerequisite to a justifiable armed reprisil
under this analysis. As previously noted, intermediacy has three basic
characteristics: (1) a continuing relationship of "hostility and strain;"
(2) a conflict over issues so "fundamental and deep-rooted" that a solu-
tion to any one of them would not ease the strain; and (3) a desire by
both nations not to go to war. 8 2 With respect to the Arab-Israeli situa-
180. See pp. 292-98 supra for an analysis of the failure of the U.N. rule.
181. The basis for this intermediacy test can be found in a proposed rule for
peace time reprisals submitted by Professor Falk. Falk, supra note 9, at 441-42.
182. Jessup, supra note 3, at 100-06. One political observer has commented:[Israel] is a small state surrounded by much larger Arab states, which have
openly vowed to destroy it. They cannot do so by classical warfare. They have
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tion, the initial question is whether there exists a state of intermediacy.
Apparently, there is no official declaration of war' 83 between the Arab
states and Israel because this would involve recognizing Israel as a state.'
8 4
Such recognition is irreconcilable with the official Arab position that Israel
does not legally exist as a state. Although no war exists, an objective
analysis of Arab-Israeli relations compels the conclusion that those nations
are not at peace. The Arab states have announced on numerous occasions
that they view relations with Israel as continuously hostile. However,
for purposes of analyzing the Beirut raid it is necessary to focus on
Israel's relationship vis-A-vis Lebanon since that relationship has been
less hostile than Israel's relations with the other Arab nations. If the
requisite hostility does not exist between Israel and Lebanon, an armed
reprisal committed by either of these states would necessarily be un-
justifiable and hence illegal under this test. Arguably, Lebanon is part
of the Arab world which has taken a position favoring guerrilla warfare
as a means of regaining Palestine. 8 5 The Beirut raid was directed against
Arab-owned planes, not merely those owned by Lebanon, to deter the
entire Arab bloc, of which Lebanon is an inextricable part, from support-
ing fedayeen activity. Thus, there is a continuing relationship of "hostility
and strain"'' 80 between Israel and Lebanon as well as between Israel and
the other Arab states.' 8 7 Hence the first element is met. Secondly, there
are "fundamental and deep-rooted" issues at the core of the Mideast
controversy, the most important of which being the right of Israel to
exist as a state. The Arabs contend that Israel was created contrary
tried open aggression and have been defeated and humiliated, so they have
resorted to anarchy and guerrilla warfare.
The Arabs are exploding in their impotence. They have established their
subversive headquarters in Amman. They avoid a major clash with the more
modern, organized Israeli forces, but supply guerrillas with money, arms and
technical aid. . . .The Arabs think they can hijack airplanes, defy the rules of
international commerce, and get away with it .... Nasser thinks he can use the
techniques of the Vietcong in Vietnam to restore the military balance he lost in
the six-day war against the Israelis. . . . [A]nd when one side resorts to the
techniques of anarchy, as the Arabs have done against the Israelis, the whole
community of nations has to think about the consequences.
Reston, The Rise of Anarchy in International Relations, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1969,
at 46, cols. 5-8 (emphasis added).
183. D. BOWETT, supra note 134, at 191. What Bowett wrote concerning the
Arab-Israeli situation as it existed twenty years ago is applicable today:
[N]either party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent or required
to exercise the right of visit, search, and seizure for any legitimate purpose of
self-defense.
Id.
184. Rosenne, Directions for a Middle East Settlement - Some Underlying Legal
Problems, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 44, 50 (1968).
185. A statement attributed to the Lebanese Prime Minister indicates that the
armed effort of the Arab guerrillas was politically supported and approved by the
Lebanese Government. Falk, supra note 9, at 421 n.18:
Fedayeen action is legitimate, and no one can condemn the fedayeen for what
they are doing. Their aim is to retrieve their homeland and their plundered
rights. . . .Thus, I say, fedayeen action is legal.
Id.
186. See Rosenne, supra note 184, at 50-51.
187. Falk, supra note 9, at 431 n.42.
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to the terms set by the United Nations for a Jewish state.'88 Israel, on
the other hand, claims that the land they now occupy is a re-embodiment
of the Kingdoms of 933 to 722 and 168 to 83 B.C. "The two millennia of
dispersion are dismissed as a parenthesis in history."' 89 Even if these
two elements of intermediacy are satisfied, the real problem is with the
third - that neither state desires to go to war. Although that is the
official position of the states involved, both sides do seem willing to resort
to force when necessary. 190 The Arabs have been content since the 1967
conflict to achieve their goals through terroristic tactics. The Israeli
Government resorted to violent use of force in the Six Day War, and
since that time has adopted the use of armed reprisals to respond to
guerrilla attacks.191
B. Provocation
In order to be upheld, an armed reprisal during status mixtus must
be in response to a prior international tort which endangers vital national
interests. Those vital interests include the territorial integrity of the
state, 92 the lives of its nationals at home and abroad, 93 and any other
imminent threat to the existence of the state. 9 4 A threat to any one of
these interests supplies the requisite injury justifying the use of an
armed reprisal. This requirement is an expansion of the customary in-
ternational law rule since it permits an armed reprisal for any substantial
threat to the existence of the state - a justification not present under the
customary rule. Specifically, there need not be a direct intrusion or physi-
cal trespass into the territory of the retaliating state as was required under
both the traditional rule and a literal reading of Article 51. This gives
the intermediacy rule the added flexibility necessary to reflect the realities
of such a situation.
The Athens raid fulfills the provocation requirement for two reasons:
(1) an Israeli national was killed,195 and (2) the destruction of an El Al
airplane, viewed as one of a series of attempts to destroy Israel's airlink
188. O'Brien, supra note 14, at 693-95.
189. Marshall, Reflections on the Middle East, 11 ORBIs 343, 346 (1967).
190. O'Brien, supra note 14, at 695-96.
191. Id.
192. I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, at 255, 258-59.
193. D. BOWETT, supra note 134, at 87-105; I. BROWNLIE, supra note 152, at
289-98; I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, at 256-57; Waldock, supra note 140, at
466-67, 503.
194. An example of such a threat is the installation of surface to surface missiles
directed at the aggreived state. This is a serious threat to the territorial integrity
of this aggrieved state. Attacking the aircraft of a state is also considered a significant
threat to the national interest. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 152, at 433. It should be
noted that the mere loss of property owned by nationals abroad is not deemed a
sufficient injury in itself to justify an armed reprisal. D. BOWETT, supra note 134,
at 111.
195. Falk, supra note 9, at 416. The killing of a national in itself is sufficient
provocation when it is done deliberately, manifesting a policy of aggression directed
against a state's citizens abroad.
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with' the outside world,190 constitutes a threat to its national existence'9
since Israel is surrounded on three sides by hostile states, making air
traffic a principal means of maintaining a viable economy. Even though
Israel's territorial integrity was not violated, a vital national interest was
infringed. Thus, at this juncture, the Athens raid constitutes an adequate
provocation to justify an armed reprisal.
While the customary rule of armed reprisals requires that a reason-
able amount of time elapse prior to the retaliation'9" during which all
peaceful solutions must be exhausted, 199 the intermediacy rule should not
be so strict. During intermediacy, there is a continuing relationship of
hostility. Thus, diplomatic overtures to a state to take decisive action
would in all likelihood be ignored.200 Such was the case with Israeli
warnings to the Arab nations with respect to fedayeen activity. Further-
more, if other means of self-help short of armed coercion are available
to stop the illegal acts being perpetrated against the responding state, i.e.,
embargo, raising tariffs, or closing a frontier, then those means must be
used.2 0 1 These economic sanctions are effective, however, only where the
aggrieved state is in a position of economic superiority such that the
offending state's economy is dependent upon the economy of the aggrieved.
Intermediacy, by definition, suggests that the issues in controversy be-
tween the states involved are not likely to be settled peacefully. There-
fore, the likelihood of settling the particular delinquency in question is
slight. If such peaceful solution is possible, then it must be attempted
prior to the commission of an armed reprisal.
During quasi-belligerency, an immediate armed reprisal should be
permitted where there exists strong indicia that the provocation is only
one of a series of international delinquencies. Admittedly, some time
must elapse within which the culpable state can make redress. Where a
series of international wrongs are involved, and the government con-
trolling the territory from which they emanate remains silent, it will, in
all probability, make no difference whether the injured state waits one
day or one month for the injurying state to offer reparations. Therefore,
it seems reasonable to allow an immediate response where a sufficient
time has elapsed during which the culpable government could issue a
policy statement regarding the provocation. It follows from this reason-
ing that the Israeli Government was justified in waiting only two days
196. Id. at 417-19.
197. Attacks upon a nation's aircraft have been considered a threat to a significant
national interest that would justify an armed reprisal. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 152,
at 433.
198. II L. OPPENHEim, supra note 18, at 142, noted in Note, supra note 12, at 113.
199. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 136.
200. Nevertheless, there must be a demand for redress either through diplomatic
channels or by official government statements because this will impress upon the
minds of the leaders of the delinquent country that it should take positive steps to
rectify the situation. This is especially true where the nation plans to use a reprisal
to compel the delinquent state to act. Id. at 142 n.6.
201. See notes 57, 60 & 61 supra.
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before responding to the Athens incident. During this two day period,
the Prime Minister of Lebanon not only condoned the Athens raid, but
actually applauded it.20
2
C. Imputed Responsibility
As was stated with respect to the customary rule, an armed reprisal
is valid only if directed toward the government responsible for the breach
of international law. If the delictual conduct is directly attributable to
the government, then, without further inquiry, the government is legally
responsible and may be the object of an armed reprisal. 20 3 A more diffi-
cult question is presented where paramilitary organizations operating
within the borders of a state are the perpetrators of the international
injury. In order to retaliate against the state, there must be a nexus
between the government and the groups responsible for the provocation. 20 4
This nexus is not established merely by demonstrating that the wrong-
doers are citizens of the offending state.20 5 However, it is established
where the nationals proceed to commit a breach of international law at
the direction or with the authorization, implicit or explicit, of their
government, or where the government has failed to act to prevent the
delinquency. 20 6 In such circumstances, the illegal acts may be imputed
to the government. The government is as liable as if it conducted the
action itself through its regular armed forces.20 7 If, however, the State
is incapable of controlling the activities of the guerrillas, then its failure
to control them does not render it responsible. 20 8
The Beirut raid was directed primarily against the Lebanese Govern-
ment for what Israel believed to be its role in the Athens raid. The
retaliation at Beirut meets this aspect of the intermediacy test only if
Lebanon was, in fact, legally responsible. If Lebanon was responsible
because it did not attempt to punish the wrongdoers or take steps to
insure against the recurrence of similar delinquencies, 20 9 then it has
violated its duty under international law to protect Israel against future
202. See note 210 infra.
203. I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 338 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1954);
Note, supra note 12, at 110. Note that this is the eighth edition of the Oppenheim
treatise.
204. Falk, supra note 9, at 441.
205. No state is absolutely responsible for international delicts committed by its
nationals acting within its territory. I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 203, at 337; Note,
supra note 12, at 111.
206. I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 203, at 228; Note, supra note 12, at 111. In
addition to exercising reasonable care, if the illegal acts do occur, a duty to punish
the wrongdoers exists. Id.
207. I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 203, at 338; Note, supra note 12, at 111.
208. Note, supra note 12, at 112. In customary interational law some nations
have been held responsible for acts over which they had no control. E. COLBERT,
supra note 20, at 67. However, where no ability to control is present, an armed
reprisal against this nation is punitive, not deterrent in its effect. This violates the
proportionality requirement. See pp. 305-06 infra.
209. Note, supra note 12, at 110.
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attacks. 2 10 That Lebanon did not act to prevent the Athens raid has
already been documented ;211 that it had the capacity to do so was clearly
demonstrated in the months following the Beirut reprisal. During that
time, the commandoes within Lebanon were silent. There were no subse-
quent raids against Israel and, in fact, no belligerent activity of any
kind originating from Lebanese territory. From this, it is reasonable to
conclude that prior to the Beirut reprisal the government of Lebanon had
the capability to limit the fedayeen activity.
One further problem with imputing responsibility to a government
is the perspective from which culpability is to be judged. If there is
evidence which indicates to a substantial degree that there exists the
requisite nexus between the breach of international law and the govern-
ment allegedly responsible, then such a link may be inferred by the re-
sponding state for the purposes of this element of the test. The culpability
requirement of this test was also an element of the customary rule.
212
D. The Unavailability of Remedies Under
the United Nations
Any test which permits the use of force must be cognizant of the
intent of the United Nations' members in attempting to limit the use of
force by the United Nations Charter. Ideally, the United Nations should
be a forum in which all international disputes are settled, thereby eliminat-
ing the undesirable alternative of having each state act on its own initiative
to enforce international law. However, there are at least two situations
where reliance upon the United Nations for peaceful solution is imprac-
ticable. First, a state would not resort to the United Nations where there
is a threat to this state's national interests, and either (a) past experience
in the United Nations has shown that no action will be forthcoming from
that body,2 13 or (b) one of the nations on the Security Council has
aligned itself with the delinquent state and uses its veto power to block
action against the aggressor state.2 14  Secondly, resort to the United
Nations should not be required where that body is powerless to provide
a remedy because the offender is not a member 215 or not a state, and,
therefore, not amenable to United Nations action.
210. See Falk, supra note 9, at 420-21. There is evidence that the Arab guerrillas
are permitted to conduct all of these activities by the Lebanese Government. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 9, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 26, col. 4. See Note, supra note 12, at 111.
Instead of condemning the Athens raid, the Lebanese Government applauded the
raid as "legal and sacred." N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1969, § 4, at 1, col. 2.
211. See note 12 supra.
212. See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
213. J. STONE, No PEACE - No WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST 4, 5 (1969). Too
many members of the Security Council are politically committed to voting favorably
for Arab causes. It was unlikely that any pro-Israeli resolution would be adopted
since five out of the fifteen Members of the Security Council refuse "even to maintain
diplomatic relations with her." Id. at 4.
214. Blum, supra note 92, at 98; See also Yost, The Arab-Israeli War: How It
Began, 46 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 304 (1968). It should be noted that the Soviet Union
vetoed a comparatively weak resolution that was pro-Israel and anti-Syrian. Id.
at 304-05.
215. See note 131 and accompanying text supra.
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The Beirut raid qualifies under the first exception. Israel had been
censured previously for engaging in armed reprisals, 216 and it was ap-
parent to the Israeli Government that the United Nations would not act
so as to protect Israeli interests. In addition, the Soviet Union, a member
of the Security Council, was inextricably tied to the Arab cause, and
would oppose any measure condemning the Arab states. 217 This rationale
does not address the question whether a right of reprisal exists in spite
of Article 51 or whether the right is abrogated by that provision. Rather,
it presumes the existence of a natural right to take those measures neces-
sary for survival.
E. Proportionality
Once it is determined that the use of force is justifiable under the
test, a further question remains, namely, the determination of the amount
of force that may be employed by the responding state. The customary
rule required that the reprisal be proportional, but as has been seen, that
is subject to at least four different meanings.218 Proportionality, as used
in an intermediacy context, means that amount of force necessary to
deter future acts which threaten national interests of the responding
state. The objective of the reprisal must be to compel a cessation of
delictual conduct.2 19 If the amount of force used precipitates a war, then
it is prima facie disproportionate. 220 A further restriction on the use of
force is that it must be exercised so as to evidence a high regard for
human life,221 else it fails to meet this standard of proportionality. Finally,
if there is no reasonable expectation on the part of the retaliating state
that a reprisal will effectively deter future illegal conduct,22 2 then its
purpose is to punish, and the reprisal would be considered illegal.223
216. Israel was censured in 1966 by a 14-0 vote for conducting an armed reprisal
against the Jordanian village of Es Samu in response to guerrilla raids along the
border. O'Brien, supra note 14, at 699.
217. See note 214 supra.
218. For a discussion of the customary rules concerning proportionality, see notes
103 to 108 and accompanying text supra.
219. If the purpose of the reprisal is to protect a state from future attacks of this
nature, a dollar-for-dollar limitation renders this purpose unachievable. It may take
substantially more force to compel a state to assume its international duty. A senior
Israeli military officer commented:
Replying on the basis of a wing for a wing and a propellar for a propeller was
ruled out. This would not have carried the message. We had to make the point
clearly.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1968, at 3, col. 1.
220. See L. ORFIELD & E. RE, supra note 46, at 910.
221. Falk, supra note 9, at 441; Note, supra note 12, at 114.
222. When judging whether an expectation is reasonable it must be viewed from
the position of the nation launching the reprisal rather than through an ad hoc
determination. The capability of a nation to control elements within its border, the
support given to it by these groups, the political statements issued by this govern-
ment, the likelihood of provoking a war should be some of the relevant factors that
bear upon the question of reasonable expectation.
223. Since the purpose is to deter, a reprisal that has punishment as its sole pur-
pose fails to measure up to this purpose because it achieves only revenge. It does
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The Beirut raid fulfills this requirement because it was executed
humanely 224 - neither civilians nor military personnel were injured in
any manner. Its purpose was to deter Lebanese guerrilla activity by
forcing the Lebanese Government to limit commando interference with
significant Israeli national interests, namely, its air traffic 225 and links
with the outside world.
F. Appropriate Targets
Having ascertained the amount of force permissible, it remains to
delimit the type of targets against which an armed reprisal may be
executed. This involves a preliminary determination of responsibility.
Naturally, innocent states are not appropriate targets for retaliation, but
if a government is directly or indirectly responsible for a breach of inter-
national law, then the state it represents is an appropriate target. Within
such a state, the attack itself is appropriate if it: (1) communicates that
the responding state is holding the offending state responsible, and (2)
achieves the desired objective of deterrence. More specifically, some
targets are more appropriate than others. Where the provocation is
attributable to a group of guerrillas, as in the instant example, one appro-
priate target would be the base camps where these guerrillas train. These
groups might be deterred and, in any event, would know that Israel
was holding them responsible. However, this might not be an effective
not result in an injunctive type remedy that this view of proportionality has as its
goal. This is why Israel did not retaliate for the Iraqi hangings. N.Y. Times, Jan. 30,
1969, at 2, col. 2.
224. Falk, supra note 9, at 41; Note, supra note 12, at 115.
The Israeli representative to the Security Council stated:
An opinion was expressed in this Council that Israel's action was dispro-
portionate to the terror attacks that preceded it. When would Israel's action
have been proportionate to them? Had the assailants of the aircraft in Athens
succeeded in blowing up the airplane and killing the fifty persons aboard, or
had they brought about the explosion of other airplanes on the field and of the
airport installations, would that have made the Israeli action proportionate?
Should we have waited until Arab warfare succeeded in bringing about such a
catastrophe? Should we have waited until terror attacks from Lebanon against
Israel territory resulted in more casualties and more damage? Are we engaged
here in keeping the score of success and failure in murder or in an effort to
thwart it? Is proportionality between one act and another to be established by
the impressiveness of the damage caused or by the extent of the act's danger,
by its purpose, by its background and motivation?
It is odd to hear several supporters of Arab aggression in the Middle East
suggest that Israel pay compensation for the aircraft destroyed at the Beirut
airfield. And who will pay for the loss of Israeli lives? Is the single life of
the Israeli engineer killed in Athens while on a United Nations mission worth
less than all the metal and wire and upholstery destroyed in Beirut? Who will
determine that? Or are the shares of the owners of the Arab airlines more
privileged than human life? Who will compensate Israel for the hundreds of its
citizens killed in the course of the existing cease-fire? Who will make reparation
for the damage to the border villages that are being shelled incessantly or the
Jews lingering since June 1967 in Arab concentration camps, for the property
of nearly a million Jewish refugees from Arab lands, or for the twenty years of
Arab war against Israeli territory and people?
U.N. Doc. S/PV1461, at 56 (1968) (remarks of Mr. Tekoah of Israel).
225. Note, supra note 12, at 114-15.
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response for any one of several reasons: (1) the terrorists may be re-
ligiously motivated and a direct attack upon them would only intensify
their hatred for the responding state; (2) the government may be re-
sponsible for aggression emanating from its territory and to punish the
aggressors and not the government might be deemed by some publicists
to be an unjust response; or (3) a direct attack upon the guerrillas may
elicit more support for a movement which does not already have over-
whelming popular support. While a direct response against the govern-
ment will often cause that government to take the steps desired by the
responding state, it may not be effective where the government is not
able to control subversive elements. In such a situation, guerrilla training
camps would be a more appropriate target.
A reprisal directed against civilians is inappropriate since this would
be done more to punish than to deter future aggression. It has been
stated above that the reprisal must show a high regard for human life.
Concomitantly, it should also be noted that privately owned property
may be a target for reprisal. The goal of using private property as a
target would be to arouse public opinion. This in turn would put pres-
sure on the government to limit guerrilla activity. Such a response might
achieve the deterrence objective, but there may be a question as to
whether it would satisfy the communicative objective. That is, the
reprisal may not communicate to the offending state that it was being
held responsible. Unless the communicative criterion is present, the
target chosen is not appropriate.
The Beirut raid resulted in the destruction of $43.8 million worth
of aircraft 22 owned by private individuals, Arab corporations, inter-
governmental corporations and foreign states.227 The attack upon both
privately and governmentally owned property did communicate the reason
for the response - that the Lebanese Government was being held re-
sponsible for the Athens attack, and had better limit the activities of
the guerrillas operating from within its borders. Hence, this part of the
test is satisfied. In conclusion, then, the Beirut raid meets the criteria
established for a legal armed reprisal during, intermediacy.
VIII. THE GULF OF TONKIN - A SECOND EXAMPLE
Having outlined a test for judging reprisals during intermediacy
and having applied it to the Beirut reprisal, an additional reprisal, a
response to the Gulf of Tonkin228 raid, will be examined to determine
226. Falk, supra note 9, at 415; N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1969, § 4, at 1, cols. 2-3.
227. Lebanon did not own all of the aircraft destroyed; many were owned by
other Arab governments in conjunction with foreign investors and governments such
as the United States. Falk, supra note 9, at 415 n.1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1969, § 4,
at 1, cols. 2-3.
228. 110 CONG. R~c. 18399 (1964) (remarks of Senator Fulbright).
On August 2 the U.S. destroyer Maddox was attacked without provocation by
North Vietnamese torpedo boats in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. ...
The United States thereupon warned the Hanoi regime of "grave consequences"
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whether it was justifiable under this analysis. This reprisal occurred
subsequent to two alleged attacks on American destroyers in "inter-
national waters"'229 by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. The provocation
induced the United States Congress to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolu-
tion ,230 but neither this enactment, the political implications of that con-
flict, nor its constitutionality are apposite to the scope of this Comment.
28 1
A. Intermediacy
The United States, prior to the Gulf of Tonkin incident, was not in
a state of war with North Vietnam, as the level of military involvement
was insignificant and the American role was primarily advisory and
financial. However, the relationship between North Vietnam and the
United States prior to this reprisal could hardly be termed peaceful. On
the contrary, it was one of continuing animosity and hostility. This
hostility dates back to the American support for the French during their
struggle with the Viet Minh.282 The issues that flow from this hostility
are so "fundamental and deep-rooted" that even today, seven years after
the Gulf of Tonkin incident, they have not been resolved. Ostensibly to
prevent the spread of communism, the United States politically and mili-
tarily supported the South Vietnamese Government to the consternation
of the North Vietnamese who maintain that the United States is
supporting a violation of the Geneva Agreement which provides for the
reunification of the South and the North.283 A further issue is the clash
of ideologies - communism and democratic capitalism. It is submitted
that these issues obstruct any hope of resolving ancillary issues such as
in the event of further military attacks on American forces. On August 4 [1964]
the Maddox and another destroyer, the C. Turner Joy, were again attacked by
North Vietnamese torpedo boats in international waters .... The United States
thereupon responded with air strikes against North Vietnamese torpedo boats
and their supportin, facilities at various points on the coast of North Vietnam.
The American action was limited and measured in proportion to the provoca-
tion which gave rise to it. It was an act of self-defense wholly consistent with
article 51 of the United Nations Charter and an act of limited retaliation wholly
consistent with the international law of reprisal. The single, most notable fact
about the American action was its great restraint as an act of retaliation taken
by a great power in response to the provocation of a small power.
229. North Vietnam is one of several nations that assert that its territorial waters
extend to a twelve mile limit, whereas the United States has consistently maintained
a policy that three miles is the maximum limit to territorial waters. In order to
demonstrate its non recognition of the twelve mile limit, the United States ships
"deliberately" sailed into this twelve mile area. However, the attack itself occurred
when the destroyers were beyond the twelve mile limit. Id. at 18409.
230. 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
231. As to whether the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution may serve as the "functional
equivalent" of a Congressional declaration of war, see Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, Statement of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, National Commitments to
Foreign Powers, S. REP. No. 797, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1967). See also Forkosch,
The Constitutionality of the Vietnam Venture And a Registrant's Right to Counsel
Within the Selective Service System, 22 S.C.L. REv. 287 (1970); Malawer, The
Vietnam War Under the Constitution: Legal Issues Involved in the United States
Military Involvement in Vietnam, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 205 (1969).
232. See generally Ho CHI MINH ON REVOLUTION 216-17 (B. Fall ed. 1967).
233. Id. at 314.
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release of prisoners of war, a single election in both North and South
Vietnam, support for the guerrilla movement, or even a cease fire.
It appears that the sentiment of the American people was against
any deeper involvement in Vietnam prior to the Gulf of Tonkin provoca-
tion,234 and that Congress did not intend, even by adopting the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution itself, to authorize unrestrained military action.28 5
In addition, the North Vietnamese official position, at least as late as
1965, was that the struggle was still being waged by the National Front
for Liberation rather than by North Vietnam.2 3 6 Thus, it is posited that
during the period in which this reprisal took place, there was no requisite
intent to go to war even though both states were taking indirect action;
North Vietnam by supporting the guerrillas, and the United States by
supporting the South Vietnamese. Therefore, the characteristics of inter-
mediacy were present.
B. Provocation and the Responsibility of North Vietnam
The provocation, which consisted of an attack upon two American
destroyers in international waters, was committed by torpedo boats in
the service of North Vietnam. The question raised by this fact is whether
responsibility may reasonably be imputed to the Government of North
Vietnam for the actions of its naval contingent. Under international law,
the acts of a government's military are directly imputed to that govern-
ment.2 37 Additionally, in the interim period between the two attacks, the
United States warned the North Vietnamese Government that subse-
quent acts of aggression would not be tolerated.238 Therefore, the North
Vietnamese Government knowingly breached its international duty by
not restraining an arm of its government from committing further acts
of aggression.
Once it has been established that the provocation is attributable to
the North Vietnamese Government, a further consideration remains with
respect to whether or not the provocation was sufficient to induce an
armed response; that is, whether or not the provocation was a violation
of international law. In the instant example such a determination is
dependent upon two factors: (1) whether the provocation endangered
the territoriality or nationals of the retaliating state or was directed at
an interest essential to its preservation; and (2) whether the provocation
was justified under the circumstances. The attack by the North Viet-
namese torpedo boats cannot be viewed as an isolated incident. Rather,
it must be viewed in the entire panorama of hostility between North
Vietnam and the United States. Thus, the continuous hostility between
234. See 110 CONG. REC. 18350-51 (1964) (remarks of Senator Morse and
correspondence advocating no deeper commitment in Vietnam).
235. Id. at 18456 (remarks of Senator Keating).
236. See Ho CHI MINH ON REVOLUTION 327-28 (B. Fall ed. 1967).
237. I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 203, at 339.
238. See note 228 supra.
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the two nations and the supplying of guns and ammunition to the guer-
rillas23 9 throughout Southeast Asia elevate such a provocation to a point
where a retaliation would not be an unreasonable or unwarranted re-
sponse. Further, the provoking attack was upon naval vessels, a violation
of the freedom of the seas, and it endangered American lives. Under
these circumstances, the provocation endangered vital national interests.2 40
However, if the two destroyers precipitated the attack by their own acts
of provocation, then it would follow that the attack by the North Vietnamese
was justified and no armed reprisal would have been warranted.
When the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was considered by Congress,
one opponent argued that these destroyers had, three days prior to the
act of provocation, supported a venture by the South Vietnamese Navy
which involved the shelling of two North Vietnamese islands. This, it
was submitted, could have been interpreted by the North Vietnamese as
an act of aggression to which they felt compelled to respond.2 41 The
continued presence of American ships in the vicinity of the two islands,
whether the ships were in international waters or within the territorial
waters of North Vietnam, raises the inference that the attacks were
responses to the American involvement in the bombardment of the two
islands, rather than wholly unprovoked attacks. 242  The facts on this
issue are not sufficiently clear to make a conclusive determination. How-
ever, the facts do raise the point that a provocation, if justified, cannot
support an armed reprisal in response to it.
C. The Unavailability of Remedies Under the United Nations
If the provocation is sufficient, the right to implement a reprisal
arises only if there are no remedies in the United Nations, and all other
amicable means of settling the dispute have been exhausted. If the
response is purely an act of self-defense, it would be a permissible use
of force under Article 51 of the Charter. The reprisal against the naval
bases was an act of self-defense, yet, it was not merely an act to punish
North Vietnam for violation of its international obligations. It was an
attempt to accomplish a defensive purpose,243 i.e., the prevention of
future attacks on American ships. The United States could have sub-
mitted the dispute to the United Nations. However, it was not incon-
239. 110 CONG. REc. 18408 (1964) (remarks of Senator Fulbright concerning
aggression already attributable to North Vietnam).
240. Id. at 18415 (remarks of Senator Stennis).
Today, we have no choice. Our flag has been attacked, and our country has been
challenged in international waters - on the high seas - where we had a right
to be. Our flag and our men have been fired upon. Many hundreds, if not
thousands, of our naval personnel could have lost their lives had the torpedoes
been more accurately aimed and hit one or more of the destroyers.
241. Id. at 18425 (remarks of Senator Morse).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 18399 (remarks of Senator Fulbright indicate that the United States
believed that this reprisal did not violate article 51 but was within the scope of
self.-defense).
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ceivable that the Soviet Union would have vetoed any proposal to impose
sanctions on North Vietnam. Therefore, because the exercise of the
Soviet veto was more probable than not on an issue that was of vital
concern to the United States, the United Nations did not present an ade-
quate remedy. It became necessary, therefore, to protect certain para-
mount national interests through the use of an armed reprisal rather
than resort to an ineffective remedy.
D. Proportionality and the Appropriateness of Targets
The final two aspects of the test, proportionality and appropriateness
of targets, will be applied conjunctively. The reprisal was limited in the
amount of force utilized 244 and was perpetrated for the purpose of deter-
ring future attacks of a similar nature. Thus, the complete or partial
destruction of torpedo boats and bases would accomplish this deterrent
purpose. Under the proposed test for proportionality, this reprisal would
be proportional to the provocation, proportionality here meaning that
amount of force necessary to accomplish the objective sought. In direct-
ing the reprisal strictly against the source of the provocation, the United
States chose targets that would reasonably tend to accomplish the objec-
tive to deter. The reprisal communicated to North Vietnam that the
United States was holding it directly responsible for the provocation (the
communicative aspect), and that North Vietnam should take measures
to control its military forces or similar reprisals would be implemented
(the deterrent aspect). Here, the selected targets reasonably tended to
accomplish the purpose of deterrence, and thus would be appropriate.2 45
In conclusion, this reprisal was a valid exercise of the use of deterrent
force in intermediacy unless there was a justification for the provoking act.
IX. CONCLUSION
It is posited that a dichotomous approach to international law
problems is unrealistic. States are not always either at war or at peace
with other states. Oftentimes their relationships fall within the charac-
teristics of intermediacy. If the relationship is labeled intermediacy, the
legal consequences of calling it a war are avoided. Yet, the relationship
is-being described as it really exists - a relationship of fundamental
and deep-rooted differences which preclude a peaceful settlement even if
one of the differences is resolved. Given a relationship of intermediacy,
it is hoped that states will realize that many disputes can only be par-
tially solved. Every dispute does not result in either victory or defeat.
It is this polarization of thinking that intermediacy counteracts. If states
244. Id.
245. Id. It is apparent from the legislative history of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolu-
tion that the reprisal was restricted to the torpedo boats and the facilities that directly
supported them.
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would accept this kind of approach to problems, it is likely that world
tensions would be reduced.
Having established that intermediacy is a useful tool for analyzing
international law problems, the specific issue addressed was whether
armed reprisals are permissible during intermediacy. It is submitted that
such retaliatory acts are permitted during intermediacy. In reaching this
conclusion, the customary rule and the United Nations Charter provisions
with respect to armed reprisals were examined to show that they do not
provide a satisfactory solution to contemporary problems. One reason
for their inadequacy is that they fail to recognize intermediacy as a
relationship between states. Specifically, the customary rule sets up re-
quirements so strict that an aggrieved state cannot respond with that
amount of force necessary to insure its survival. Similarly, the United
Nations Charter provisions require that a state suffer an actual armed
attack before responding with force. According to most public inter-
national lawyers, that force, characterized as self-defense in the Charter,
is not to be deemed an armed reprisal at all. The result of both rules is
that a state may suffer devastating injury before it can act, within the
bounds of international law, to protect its vital national interests.
A test has been set forth by which the legality of reprisals during
intermediacy can be judged. The test requires (1) a status mixtus rela-
tionship, (2) a provocation which endangers vital national interests, (3)
a nexus between the delinquency and the state against which the reprisal
is directed, (4) the unavailability of a remedy through the United
Nations, (5) a proportional response, and (6) an appropriate target for
the reprisal. If all of these elements are satisfied, the reprisal would be
deemed legal. Both the Beirut raid and the United States response to the
Gulf of Tonkin incident have been scrutinized under this test. Both have
been found to be legal armed reprisals.
In essence, a new framework for analysis for a specific international
law problem has been suggested. That framework has been used and,
under it, a test established. That test has been applied to two factual
settings to determine its validity. The question remaining is whether
publicists and those who are concerned about public international law
will use intermediacy as a framework for analyzing other international
problems. Therefore, only in time can it be determined whether this
framework better structures international expectations and enhances order
in the international arena.
Alan N. Salpeter
Jonathan C. Waller
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